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I. INTRODUCTION

Parole decision makers are the gatekeepers of the criminal justice system.
The efforts of police, defense and state attorneys, judges, and prison personnel
culminate in a single question: When should an offender be released? In most
jurisdictions, some or all releases result from the discretionary decisions of

* Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University Law School. Consultant in
Parole Law for the National Institute of Corrections, U.S. Dep't of Justice. Served on the Utah
Board of Pardons from 1980 to 1990. The author is indebted to Professors Roark M. Reed,
Ellen K. Solender, Walter W. Steele, Jr., and Harvey Wingo for their comments on earlier drafts
of this article, and to Chris Rehmet and Lina Reyes-Trevino for their research assistance. Special
thanks to Professor Fred Moss for his patience and valuable comments.
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parole boards. The parole boards rely on information from police, presentence
investigators, corrections officials, therapists, victims, and the offender.
Released offenders, or parolees, specifically promise in their parole agreements to lead law-abiding lives. If offenders breach their parole agreements,
the parole board may return those offenders to prison.
Traditionally, a parole board's unfettered discretion determined when an
offender could leave prison. Within broad parameters set by the legislature,
the authority of parole decision makers has been extensive and far-reaching.
The power of the parole board - God-like to inmates - has not escaped
notice by the public,' by commentators, 2 or by courts.I
Exercise of this discretion has important implications for the criminal
justice system and society in general. It affects public safety by selecting for
release those inmates predicted to discontinue criminal behavior. It allocates
resources by controlling the population of prisons and community corrections
centers. It'influences prison officials' ability to control inmate populations
because boards consider prison behavior in deciding whether to release the
inmates. Most significantly, however, the exercise of parole discretion
influences the legitimacy of the entire criminal justice system. That legitimacy
is best served when victims, offenders, and the general public perceive parole
decisions as fair and rational.
This article examines the contributions, if any, that parole release
guidelines can make to the rationality of the criminal justice system. Part I
begins with a brief background of punishment and then describes state
sentencing and parole practices. It sets out the basic conceptual paradigms,
explores discretion, and concludes that structured parole release decisionmaking is desirable. Part II proposes release guidelines as a mechanism for
structuring discretion and describes guideline purposes, operation, and
benefits. Part III explores the constitutional implications of release guidelines,
considering the relationship between sentencing and parole and surveying due
process jurisprudence, including challenges to both sentencing and parole
guidelines. Part III concludes that release guidelines need not invoke the Due

1. See, e.g., RAisING ARIZONA (Twentieth-Century Fox 1987) (providing an unflattering
portrayal, in a comedy film, of a parole board).
2. See, e.g., Julio A. Thompson, Note, A BoardDoes Not a Bench Make: Denying QuasiJudicialImmunity to ParoleBoard Members in Section 1983 Damages Actions, 87 MICH. L.
REv. 241 (1988) (discussing problems in the parole board system, including the lack of
thoroughness among board members and the limited checks on their authority, which problems
have led to the boards violating constitutional rights of both prisoners and other citizens).
3. See, e.g., Larsson v. Iowa Bd. of Parole, 465 N.W.2d 272, 275 (Iowa 1991) ("Historically, corrections officials have been given broad discretion with respect to the role parole rightly
plays in an individual prisoner's constructive reintegration into society."); Moore v. Ruth, 556
So. 2d 1059, 1061 (Miss. 1990) ("The Circuit Court was certainly correct when it said parole
was a matter of sound discretion, not of right, and that the Parole Board had broad discretionary
authority regarding grants of parole .... " (citations omitted)).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss3/6
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Process Clause, and even if they do invoke the clause, the process that is due
is minimal. Finally, the article offers recommendations for implementing
parole guidelines.

II. SENTENCING AND PAROLE PRACTICE
A. History and Purposes of Punishment
Parole release decisions are not merely the end products of modern
criminal justice systems. More accurately, history reveals that these decisions
are artifacts of much thought that has been given to punishment over time.
Early sentencing practices in Western culture were based on compensation to
the tribe for transgressions that diminished its strength.' Sanctions focused
on restoring the loss to the group rather than inflicting pain on the wrongdoer.' Eventually, criminal sanctions became primarily punitive. As such, they
assumed forms lacking neither in imagination nor brutality. 6 In the eighteenth
century, incarceration was introduced as a sentencing option, though in the
earlier part of the era, capital punishment continued to be the most widely
imposed sanction.7 As the American states began abolishing corporal
punishment in post-Revolutionary times, they increasingly used incarceration
as a substitute.' Furthermore, the Biblical underpinning of moral responsibility9 made it natural for criminologists to view imprisonment as an opportunity
to encourage the spiritual rehabilitation of offenders in "penitentiaries. "10
However, offenders, as a class, were not sufficiently penitent to change
their erring ways. Therefore, in the eighteenth century, the justification for
incarceration was based on the hedonistic formula of deterrence."
The
assumption was that rational people would not commit crimes if the punishment outweighed the gain."
The popularity of the deterrent theory of
punishment waned, and by the late nineteenth century optimism that anything
could be cured replaced it. 3 Diseases were defeated, and psychiatrists began

4.

ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING §

1:1 (2d ed. 1991).

5.Id.
6. See id.
7. Id. § 1:2.

8. Id.; see also United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433, 448-50 (1922) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (discussing early American history of sentencing and punishment).
9. See SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTIcE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JusTIcE
13, 69, 73-75 (1980).
10.Id. at 69.
11. Gray Cavender & Michael C. Musheno, TheAdoption andImplementationofDetenninate-

Based Sanctioning Policies:A CriticalPerspective, 17 GA. L. REv. 425, 432 (1983).
12. Id.
13. J.S. Bainbridge Jr., The Return of Retribution, A.B.A. J., May 1987, at 60, 61.
Published by Scholar Commons, 1994
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treating ills of the mind. 4 Everyone believed that the new-found cause of
crime, inadequate moral training, could be remedied."5 In 1949 the United
States Supreme Court announced that "[r]etribution is no longer the dominant
objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders
have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence." 6
Dissatisfaction with the failure of prisons to rehabilitate resulted in
changes in sentencing systems and penal institutions - changes designed to
improve rehabilitation.' 7 Typically the evolved systems bore these traits: The
character of the offender was an important factor in sentencing decisions,
sentences were expressed as minimum and maximum periods, and inmates
were evaluated at the end of the minimum sentence to determine whether they
were sufficiently rehabilitated to be released.' 8 Embracing the dominant
sentencing rationale of rehabilitation, this scheme became known as "indeterminate sentencing" 9 and was practiced by every jurisdiction in some form
at some time.20
The promise of the rehabilitative model was short-lived. By the 1960's
the American Correction Association regarded it as archaic.2" In 1978
Justice Burger criticized indeterminate sentencing under the rehabilitative
model. 2 The virtue of individualized treatment had become the vice of
disparity. 3 Critics pointed out that release was influenced by factors that had
no impact on rehabilitation.
The vast parole board discretion led to

14.
15.
16.
at 61.
17.

Id.
Id.
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949), quoted in Bainbridge, supra note 13,
Alan M. Dershowitz, Background Paper, in THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK
67, 89-91 (1976).

FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT

18. See id. at 90-95.
19. See infra text accompanying note 41.
20. See Dershowitz, supra note 17, at 95. Likewise, federal courts had broad discretion in
setting punishments before the implementation of the federal sentencing guidelines. In an
indeterminate sentencing system, the law allowed judges to impose sentences anywhere within
a broad statutory range. The Parole Commission then had authority to substantially reduce the
term. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: A
REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINES SYSTEM AND SHORT-TERM IMPACTS ON
DISPARITY IN SENTENCING, USE OF INCARCERATION, AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND

PLEA BARGAINING 31

(1991)

[hereinafter FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES].

21. See Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 61.
22. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 46-48 (1978) (noting the serious practical
problems the model presented for judges). The sentencing scheme in Grayson was superseded
by the FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 20.
23. Cf. CAMPBELL, supra note 4, § 4:1; Andrew von Hirsch & Kathleen Hanrahan,
Determinate Penalty Systems in America: An Overview, 27 CRIME & DELINQ. 289, 292 (1981)
(discussing the need to cure disparities in sentencing).
24. See MARvIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 93-95 (1973).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss3/6
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abuses.'5 Even when no abuses occurred, parole boards could not accurately
assess a prisoner's rehabilitative progress. Prisoners themselves lived with
uncertainty and directed their efforts toward manipulating evidence of
rehabilitation.' Power placed in the hands of corrections officials and the
proliferation of the use of informants in prisons led to inmate unrest and
riots,27 which served to highlight the failings of the entire criminal justice

system and of indeterminate sentencing. Although no sentencing system had
ever been demonstrated to have a deterrent effect on the crime rate,' the
inability of indeterminate sentencing to stop or even slow the tide of crime was
offered as proof of its failure.29 The length of sentences increased because
escalating crime induced legislators to set longer maximum sentences.3 °
Judges used these maximum sentences, fully expecting parole boards to release
a prisoner after serving only a fraction of the original sentence. 31 For
example, an offender thought to be removed from society after being sentenced
to two life terms was released on parole, serving only sixteen years. 32 The

call went out for "Truth in Sentencing." 33 The public demanded to know the
real effect of sentences.
Broad parole board discretion had other unfortunate consequences.
Certainly among the corollaries to Murphy's Law is this maxim: When a
parole board may do anything it wishes, it will. Lacking a cohesive

25. See, e.g., PETER MAAS, MARIE, A TRUE STORY (1983) (accounting the story of former
Tennessee Parole Board Chairperson Marie Raggianti, who played a key role in the prosecution
of board members that subsequently confessed to selling paroles).
26. See Robert W. Kastenmeier & Howard C. Eglit, ParoleRelease Decision-making, in
PAROLE 76, 82 (William E. Amos & Charles L. Newman eds., 1975).
27. See BERT USEEM & PETER KIMBALL, STATES OF SIEGE: U.S. PRISON RIOTS, 1971-1986,
at 94-95, 105 (1989).
28. See Sheldon Ekland-Olson et al., Crime and Incarceration:Some ComparativeFindings
from the 1980s, 38 CRIME & DELINQ. 392, 392 (1992).
29. See JANET SCHMIDT, DEMYSTIFYING PAROLE 138 (1977).
30. FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 34-35 (1964).
31. This phenomenon is not new. Many first year law students know that the court which
imposed the death penalty in The Queen v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 L.R. 273 (Q.B.D. 1884),
fully expected the penalty to be commuted.
32. See Patricia Davis, Jury'sStill Out on SentencingSystems in Virginia,WASH. POST, Feb.
15, 1988, at B1.
33. Truth in sentencing was among the arguments supporting the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. Glen Elsasser, Panel Proposes New System for Judges: Plan Callsfor Sentencing
Guidelines, CHI. TRIn., Feb. 5, 1987, § 1, at 10. It has been and continues to be a source of
debate in many states. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 32, at BI; Howard Goodman, Bills Would
End Paroleto Ease JailCrowding, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, June 4, 1991, at BI; John Hurst,
Ex-Convicts Screened for Parole Release, L.A. TIMES, July 3, 1992, at A3; Toni Locy,
Committee OK's Sentencing Bill, BOSTON GLOBE, June 23, 1992, at 36. The truth in sentencing
debate also emerges as a campaign issue. See Veronica T. Jennings, Democrats Jostling in
Crowded Primaries,Wash. Post, Aug. 23, 1990, at Md. 1.
Published by Scholar Commons, 1994
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philosophy of punishment to drive decisions toward well-defined goals 34 or
perhaps failing to communicate those goals to constituencies, many boards
created the impression that, behind the closed door of the executive session,
board members tossed darts at dartboards. Largely out of fear of losing their
discretion and of inviting individual liability, parole board members have
continued to deal with ever-increasing numbers of offenders on a case-by-case
basis, long after the sheer volume greatly reduced the members' abilities to
distinguish among offenders.35 Given the number of parole decisions made
in some jurisdictions by varying panels of members, it would seem serendipitous if, when compared, those decisions were proportionate, equitable,
uniform, or predictable.
The stage having been set, jurisdictions began to experiment with

guidelines. Through creation of the United States Sentencing Commission,
policy makers in the federal system adopted sentencing guidelines as a way to
restrict judges' discretion.36 Likewise, some states also turned to sentencing
guidelines for use by their judges and sentencing commissions., 7 Even
34. The adoption of a single basic principle has properly been criticized as unrealistic. See
generallyHenry M. Hart, Jr., TheAims of the CriminalLaw,23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401
(1958) (criticizing any penal code that reflected only a single basic principle). Nevertheless,
adopting penological goals and setting priorities among competing interests enhances consistency
throughout the system.
35. The Virginia Parole Board makes parole consideration decisions in about 15,000 cases a
year. Telephone Interview with staff person of the Virginia Parole Board (Jan. 3, 1992). The
California Board of Prison Terms, which has jurisdiction over only life sentences, still has a
substantial number of cases under its jurisdiction. Ted Rich, the Board's Executive Officer,
indicates that as of December, 1993 there were 10,735 inmates serving sentences of life with a
possibility of parole. Telephone Interview with Ted Rich, Executive Director, California Board
of Prison Terms (Jan. 11, 1994).
36. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 217(a), 98 Stat. 1837,
2017 (1984) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1988)). Congress established the
United States Sentencing Commission and authorized it to promulgate sentencing guidelines to
take effect 30 months after enactment. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 note (1988). It directed the
Commission to design guidelines which would
provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding
unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have
been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility
to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating
factors not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices.
28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B).
Occasionally state parole release guidelines will be compared to the federal sentencing
guidelines. These comparisons reveal several similarities and differences: Guidelines are similar
in their intent to reduce disparity, ensure proportionality in punishment, and enhance certainty
of outcome. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 52-62. They are different in that the federal
guidelines are part of a determinate sentencing system that eschews parole entirely, and with it,
any additional information about the inmate after incarceration which might be useful in setting
a release date. 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (1988). The author will note other relevant differences in the
discussion.
37. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 537 So. 2d 982, 983-84 (Fla. 1989) (discussing the development

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss3/6
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though the interest in the results of sentencing guidelines was keen,38 other
states focused on guidelines for use by parole boards, namely release
guidelines.39 To provide a foundation for discussion of release guidelines,
detailed descriptions of the operation of state sentencing and parole practices
are now discussed.
B. Overview of Systems
To understand the need to structure discretion involved in parole decision
making, one must first understand the nature of sentencing and parole as well
as the extent of the authority wielded by sentencing and paroling authorities.
No "typical" sentencing and parole system exists; rather, an amazingly diverse
array of legislative enactments confers vast discretion.' Nonetheless, general
patterns can be discerned. In theory, systems are classified by type of
sentence - indeterminate4' or determinate.42 Most systems have aspects of
each.
In its purest form, an indeterminate sentencing system is one in which the
legislature sets a range of punishment for crimes and both a judge and parole
board exercise discretion. At sentencing the judge decides whether to
incarcerate the offenders or allow them to receive a non-custodial sanction.
If the judge decides to incarcerate, the term of incarceration is expressed as
a range of time. After some period of service, an offender requests release,
which may be granted at the discretion of the parole board. If a request is
granted, the offender is released. If it is denied, the inmate may later request
release or simply serve out the maximum sentence. When inmates are
released before the end of their sentences, they are placed on parole: a period
of supervision under rules contained in a parole agreement. If parolees violate
those terms, they may be returned to prison to serve all or part of the

of Florida's sentencing guidelines); Frank H. Easterbrook, Introduction to Equality Versus

Discretion in Sentencing, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1813 (1989) (panel discussion).
38. Major legal periodicals have recently published symposia dealing with sentencing. See,

e.g., A Symposium on Sentencing Reform in the States, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 645 (1993);
Symposium, Making Sense of the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 571
(1992); Symposium, Punishment, 101 YALE L.J. 1681 (1992).
39. For example, the Commonwealth of Virginia has developed release guidelines supported
by risk predictors validated on its own population. VIRGINIA PAROLE BOARD, PAROLE
GUIDELINES: POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL

3-5 (Draft No. 6, 1991). Colorado has a

similar history-risk assessment and release guideline scheme. See KiM ENGLISH, DIVISION OF
CRIMINAL JusrICE, COLORADO PAROLE GUIDELINES HANDBOOK v-vi (1990) (quoting COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-22.5-303.5 (repealed West Supp. 1991)).
40. ANDREW VON HIRSCH & KATHLEEN J. HANRAHAN, THE QUESTION OF PAROLE:
RETENTION, REFORM, OR ABOLrriON? 1 (1979).
41. See CAMPBELL, supra note 4, §§ 4:1 to :3.
42. See id. §§ 4:4 to :9.
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remaining term.
Indeterminate sentencing systems allocate sentencing
discretion to the judge and the paroling authority. 3
Determinate sentencing, on the other hand, is often characterized as a
system which allows offenders to know at sentencing the amount of time they
will serve in prison. Although the legislature sets a range of punishments for
each crime, the judge alone decides whether to incarcerate and exactly how
long offenders should serve. In the purest form of determinate sentencing, the
date of release is determined at the time the sentence is imposed. Parole is
eliminated altogether.'" However, a sentence may be reduced for good
behavior ("good time") according to non-discretionary criteria.45 The
determinate sentencing system vests sentencing discretion almost exclusively
with the judge.46
Reformers who insist that "parole" be abolished41 frequently confuse
determinate and indeterminate sentencing. The term "parole" has a double
referent.4" One aspect of parole establishes the date of release and defines
the actual period of confinement.49 This aspect is consistent with the
preceding description of indeterminate sentences. The second aspect of parole
is the continuing supervision of felons after release from incarceration.5" In
this different context, abolitionists appear to be calling for an end to postrelease supervision. They actually are not. Rather, they criticize the practice
of allowing offenders to serve only a fraction of their announced sentences
(i.e. indeterminate sentences). Nevertheless, some states responded to the
outcry for truth in sentencing by eliminating parole, or at least by claiming to
eliminate it.51
Many current commentators appear to believe that determinacy is now the
rule,52 but this is not the case. Probably fewer than half a dozen jurisdictions
actually have determinate sentencing systems, if determinate means that the
judge at sentencing determines the actual period of imprisonment, with or
without considering good time. In California and Illinois, for example, the
judge sets a felon's term (other than life sentences) from a legislatively
determined range. 3 However, a parole board or a prison review board
43. See generally id. §§ 4:1 to :3 (discussing indeterminate sentencing).
44. See generally id. §§ 4:4 to :9 (discussing determinate sentencing).
45. Id. § 9:19.
46. Lenore Alpert, ExercisingDiscretionon the Bench: The TrialJudge'sPerspective,in THE
INVISIBLE JUSTICE SYSTEM: DISCRETION AND THE LAW 93, 101 (Burton Atkins & Mark Pogrebin
eds., 2d ed. 1982).
47. See, e.g., VON HIRSCH & HANRAHAN, supra note 40, at 103-04.
48. Sheldon L. Messinger, Introductionto VON HIRSCH & HANRAHAN, supra note 40, at xi.

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See infra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
52. See CAMPBELL, supra note 4, § 1:3.
53. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (West Supp. 1994); 730 ILL. STAT. ANN. 5/5-8-1 (West Supp.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss3/6
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retains substantial discretion to set release dates for all life sentences."
Further, these boards provide post-release supervision, called either a parole
period or a mandatory supervised release term, which operates much like
traditional parole.
Additionally, a substantial number of felons in both of
these jurisdictions remain eligible for parole under prior indeterminate
sentence systems.5 6
By contrast, some jurisdictions continue to operate traditional indeterminate sentencing systems. For example, Idaho and Massachusetts, retaining the
term "indeterminate" in their statutes, allow a judge to sentence offenders to
a range of years and deem them eligible for parole at a statutory minimum.57
A parole commission or board, in its discretion, establishes release dates and
revokes these dates for violations of the conditions of supervision.58
A substantial number of jurisdictions, however, have made legislative
changes that replace sentence indeterminacy with language that leaves
discretion with parole boards or similar bodies. In Georgia, for example, a
judge sets a "determinate" sentence within a statutory range 5 9 but the board
may parole prisoners after they become eligible under the statute." In
Colorado and Delaware, judges sentence offenders to a definite term within a
statutory range, 61 but offenders become eligible for parole after serving a
percentage of that term.6'
Given the determinate-indeterminate dichotomy, the classification
appropriate for the various systems is unclear.63 Most determinate sentencing

1993).

54. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3046 (West Supp. 1994); 730 ILL. STAT. ANN. 5/3-3-2, 5/3-3-3
(West 1992).
55. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3000 (West Supp. 1994); 730 ILL. STAT. ANN. 5/3-3-2 (West
1992).
56. Telephone Interviewwith Ted Rich, ExecutiveDirector, CaliforniaBoard ofPrison Terms
(Jan. 11, 1994).
57. IDAHO CODE § 19-2513 (Supp. 1993); MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § 24 (West
1981).
58. IDAHO CODE § 20-210 (Supp. 1993); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 127, § 130 (West
1991).
59. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-1(a)(1) (Supp. 1993).
60. Id. § 17-10-1(b).
61. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-11-304,18-1-105 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 4205 (Supp. 1992).
62. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17-22.5-403 (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
4346 (1987).
63. Courts are unsure of the proper way to characterize these hybrids. The Supreme Court
of Colorado, reflecting on changes over the past few years, observed:
[S]tate sentencing laws, including the statutes relevant to parole, have undergone a
series of major changes. In the late 1970s, the legislature changed the parole and
sentencing system from one of "indeterminate" sentencing, which placed substantial
discretion in the sentencing courts and Parole Board, to "determinate" sentencing with
Published by Scholar Commons, 1994
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schemes allow flexibility in release and post-release supervision although the
term "parole" has been replaced with terms such as "post-release supervision"
and "mandatory supervised release term."'
Likewise, many indeterminate
sentencing systems have determinate aspects such as mandatory sentences for
some crimes.'
In reality, parole boards continue to make a significant
number of release decisions in most jurisdictions.
Moreover, boards in most jurisdictions have little guidance in making
release decisions. Once information is compiled regarding the offender's
crime, victim, criminal history, social history (including drug and alcohol use),
and institutional adjustment, parole boards or their staff interview eligible
offenders either informally or at a hearing.'
The members then make a
decision to grant or deny parole according to imprecise standards. The Rhode
Island Board may not parole unless it appears that the inmate has observed
prison rules, that release would not depreciate the seriousness of the crime,
that a reasonable probability exists that the inmate would "live and remain at
liberty without violating the law," and that the inmate can "properly assume
a role" in the community.67 The paroling authority in Ohio may grant parole
"if in its judgment there is reasonable ground to believe that. .. such action
would further the interests of justice and be consistent with the welfare and
security of society."68 The parole board in New Hampshire may release after
a minimum term if there is a "reasonable probability that [the offender] will
remain at liberty without violating the law and will conduct himself as a good
citizen. "69 In Nebraska the parole board must justify denial of parole with
a finding that "[t]here is a substantial risk [the offender] will not conform to
the conditions of parole," that releasing the offender would "depreciate the
seriousness of his crime or promote disrespect for law" or have a "substantially adverse effect on institutional discipline," or that the offender's "continued
correctional treatment . . . will substantially enhance his capacity to lead a

.mandatory" parole, which substantially removed all discretion from the sentencing
courts and Parole Board. Subsequent legislation relaxed the rigid requirements of
"determinate" sentencing and, ultimately, the legislature adopted the present
"modified determinate" sentencing system which restores some discretion to the
sentencing courts and Parole Board.
Thiret v. Kautzky, 792 P.2d 801, 803-04 (Colo. 1990) (en banc) (footnote omitted).
64. See 730 ILL. STAT. ANN. 5/5-8-1 (West Supp. 1993).
65. The Utah Legislature, for example, made aggravated sexual abuse of a child punishable
by imprisonment for a mandatory minimum sentence of 3, 6, or 9 years, and the maximum may
be for life. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-404.1 (1990).
66. See NEIL P. COHEN & JAMES J. GOBERT, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE §§ 3.17
to .22 (1983).
67. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-8-14 (Supp. 1993).
68. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.03 (Anderson 1993).
69. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 651-A:6 (1986).
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law-abiding life when released at a later date. " 7
In some jurisdictions parole statutes provide no articulated standard for
the release decision. 7' In contrast, some states mandate the use of guidelines
for release decisions.72 If parole is granted, the board sets a release date and
conditions of parole. 3 If offenders are denied parole, the board usually will
reconsider their cases at a later date. If the offenders fail to win a discretionary release from the board, they may be discharged at a mandatory release
date (a portion of the maximum sentence beyond initial parole eligibility).' 4
In systems without mandatory release, the offenders who fail to earn parole are
released when their sentences expire.75
Despite the criticism over the past decade, parole continues to be the most
common means of releasing prisoners. At the beginning of 1990 there were
680,907 inmates incarcerated throughout the United States in federal and state
prisons. 71 During that year 419,783 inmates were released.'
Of those
released, 339,439 inmates were given some form of conditional release
(parole, probation, or supervised mandatory release).7 8 The number of
people released on parole in 1990 was 159,731; this amount exceeded the
number of inmates released under supervised mandatory release (the mode
used in determinate sentencing) by 42,874Y'
When aggregated with
offenders remaining under parole supervision from previous years, the total
national parolee population was 456,803.0 The parolee population continues to rise despite efforts to abolish parole. In 1979, 138 of every 100,000
adult residents in the nation were parolees.8 In 1990, 287 of every 100,000
adult residents were parolees." At no time during the interim did the rate
decline. 3

70. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1,114 (1987).
71. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 20-210 (Supp. 1993) (empowering the State Commission of
Pardons and Paroles to set release dates, but providing no standard).
72. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-40 (1991) (requiring the Board to implement and
maintain a parole guidelines system).
73. If an offender fails to comply with the conditions of release, the parolee is returned to
prison and, after certain proceedings, may be required to serve the rest of the term.
74. CAMPBELL, supra note 4, §§ 4:2 to :3.
75. Id.§ 17:6.
76. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 1991 tbl. 6.73 (Kathleen Maguire et al. eds. 1992) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK].

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id.
Id. at tbl. 6.124.
Id. at tbl. 6.127.
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 76, at tbl. 6.127.
Id.
Id. at tbl. 6.128.
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C. Discretion in Sentencing andParole
Through various methods, state criminal justice systems place tremendous
discretion in the hands of judges, parole boards, or both. Such discretion has
been controversial. Proponents of broad discretion for judges at sentencing
argue that limiting such discretion is both unrealistic and unfair." They
argue that disparity is an unfortunate but unavoidable byproduct of individualized justice, and that individualized justice can be achieved only if judges are
free to consider all the legally relevant factors in sentencing.' Each case
presents a unique set of factors which does not yield to precise comparisons
with any other case. At sentencing, the judge must balance the tension
between the flexibility of discretion and the rigidity of uniformity. 86
Critics of judicial discretion, on the other hand, argue that judges
frequently mete out sentences in the absence of criteria and without reference
to the objectives of the criminal justice systemA7 In the absence of rules,
personal values fill the vacuum. 8 No articulated rationale appears to support
the judge's decision, and the exercise of unfettered discretion often usurps the
legislature's power to make policy.89 Critics further argue that the credentials of judges exercising discretion do not justify their immense power. 9°
For many, the problem of broad discretion leading to wildly disparate91
sentences is most troublesome. 9
Placing broad discretion with parole boards raises similar arguments.
Proponents argue that parole boards must have discretion to make fair release
decisions because each decision must be tailored to each unique offenderf 3
Parole boards argue that they are better positioned to make release decisions
than are judges. They argue that more information about the offender
becomes available with time, and boards can make better predictions about
risks of recidivism or likelihood of rehabilitation than judges can make

84. See Alpert, supra note 46, at 101.
85. Id. at 101-02.
86. Id. at 103.

87. See Marvin Frankel, Lawlessnessin Sentencing, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING 265 (Andrew
von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 1992).
88. Alpert, supra note 46, at 102.
89. Frankel, supra note 87, at 267.
90. Id. at 271.
91. "Disparity" is found to exist, under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, when defendants
with similar criminal records are found guilty of similar criminal conduct but receive dissimilar
sentences. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988).
92. See Stephen Breyer, The FederalSentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1988); Susan E. Martin, Interests and Politics
in SentencingReforn:TheDevelopmentofSentencing Guidelinesin Minnesota andPennsylvania,
29 ViLL. L. REv. 21, 27 (1983-84).
93. See CAMPBELL, supranote 4, § 4:1.
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immediately after the offender is convicted. 94 Further, discretion enables
corrections officials to better manage offenders who want to present good
institutional records to the board. Finally, early parole release will promote
law-abiding behavior by providing supervision for offenders when they return
to the community.95
As with judicial discretion, parole board discretion is most often criticized
for its arbitrariness and resulting disparity. 96

To the extent that a parole

board professes to incapacitate future offenders or to rehabilitate past
offenders, critics argue that recidivism data suggests that boards are not
successful in accomplishing these tasks. 7 Parole board members are
generally gubernatorial appointees, thus raising two additional criticisms:
Political patronage often results in underqualified board appointees and boards
are fertile breeding grounds for corruption."
Although the various forms of parole systems have been criticized, a
structuring of the discretion allowed in each system would combat the most
serious assaults against them. Guidelines can serve as the mechanism for
structuring parole release discretion.
II. PAROLE RELEASE GUIDELINES
Parole release guidelines are a collection of factors relevant to release
decisions, quantified and weighted to accomplish certain objectives by
recommending or mandating release at a specific time. 9 The factors relevant
to parole decisions include the offense, criminal history, performance under
previous parole or probation, dismissed and overturned convictions, social
history, intelligence and training, employment history, substance abuse,
physical and mental health, evidence of rehabilitation, behavior in prison, and
plans for parole.'" Policy decisions made by the promulgators of guidelines
determine whether a particular factor is included and how much bearing that
factor will have on the release decision. For example, if those who designed
the guidelines see public protection as the primary criminal justice objective,
guidelines would weigh heavily factors such as criminal history, which indicate

94. Cf. Dershowitz, supra note 17, at 82 (stating that vesting a parole decision in correction
personnel is "essential so that prisoners could be released or detained according to informed
judgments concerning their rehabilitation or likely recidivism").
95. Cf. VON HIRsCH & HANRAHAN, supra note 40, at 4.
96. See Dershowitz, supra note 17, at 101-06.
97. See VON HiRSCH & HANRAHAN, supra note 40, at 4.
98. See MAAS, supra note 25; see also Gary Taylor, ParoleConsultantsUnder Investigation
for EthicalViolations, NAT'L L.J., July 20, 1992, at 9 (discussing possible corruption involving
parole consultants).
99. COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 66, § 3.08.
100. Id. § 3.06.
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that the inmate is likely to reoffend. However, if rehabilitation were the
objective, the guidelines would weigh heavily factors such as the parole plan,
which indicates whether the offender is prepared to reintegrate into the
community.
Regardless of the criminal justice objective, the offense itself is always the
most important determinant under release guidelines because proportionality
requires it.' 0 The legislature employs proportionality, the notion that more
serious crimes deserve more serious punishment, in categorizing crimes and
assigning ranges of punishment.'02 The concept of proportionality continues
to play out in guideline construction.' °3
A. Operation of Guidelines
The initial step toward promulgating parole release guidelines is the
development of a needs assessment or, more frequently, a risk assessment
tool.104 The risk assessment tool must be empirically validated on the state's
offender population because it makes predictions about behavior. An
aggregate score, based on predictions about offenders, is used to place
offenders into risk categories.l°5 The parole release guidelines of Colorado
and Utah illustrate the operation of release guidelines. Some of the factors
used to assess risk in Colorado's release guidelines are the offender's history
of convictions, incarceration, employment, and institutional adjustment.1 °
This risk assessment instrument was validated against Colorado's criminal
population, excluding women offenders and sex offenders.'0 According to
the validation studies, Colorado offenders who score thirty-four to forty-six
points have a sixty-six percent (63 %) likelihood of reoffending (High Risk),
those who score twenty-eight to thirty-three points have a thirty-four percent
(34%) likelihood of reoffending (High Medium Risk), those who score fifteen
to twenty-seven points have a twenty-two percent (22%) likelihood of
reoffending (Medium Risk), and those who score three to fourteen points have

101. Cf. id. § 3.10 (stating that federal parole guidelines, which are designed to prevent
disparity as stated supra note 36, use offense severity as a primary sentencing factor).
102. Andrew von Hirsch, ProportionatePunishments, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING 195-99
(Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 1992).
103. See, e.g.,

UTAH SENTENCE AND RELEASE GUIDELINES, UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL

1128 (stating that the "underlying philosophy of the Guidelines is
that criminal sentences should be proportionate to the seriousness of the offense") [hereinafter
ADMINISTRATION app. D, at

UTAH SENTENCE AND RELEASE GUIDELINES].

104. ENGLISH, supra note 39, at 3-6.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 44-45.
107. Id. at 3 n. 1.
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approximately a ten percent (10%) likelihood of reoffending (Low Risk).'°
Utah's guidelines use a criminal history assessment with similar factors,
but this assessment is not intended to be a risk assessment, although the
guidelines may identify risk.0 9 A score reduction is allowed for arrest-free
street time. 10 Utah's guidelines, unlike Colorado's, are retribution based.
They allocate punishment according to offender culpability. Scores result in
the offender's placement in a "criminal history category," ranging from poor
to excellent." '
The states use the categorization differently, depending on the parole
board's manner of operation. In Colorado, inmates are eligible for parole
consideration when they have served half of their sentences. " 2 Upon
considering parole, the risk-assessment categories advise the board as follows:
For High Risk, no parole until the sentence is nearly expired or until the
inmate can be controlled with intensive supervision; for High Medium Risk,
"maybe" parole (no if the parole plan is not adequate; yes if intensive
supervision is ordered); for Medium Risk, "maybe" parole (release is
generally allowed if the parole plan is adequate); and for Low Risk, parole to
a standard parole plan."'
In Utah the criminal history categories are
arranged along the vertical axis of a matrix. This arrangement will be
explained in detail below.
The other major set of guideline factors concerns the gravity of the
criminal behavior, or proportionality. Either the title of offense for which the
offender stands convicted or reference to the actual criminal conduct as
reported by the police determines offense severity." 4 Other factors affecting
offense severity include victim vulnerability, degree and kind of the defendant's participation, and the extent to which the defendant's conduct endangers
others.
In the Colorado system, the conviction offense classification (class two
through five felonies), and mitigating and aggravating factors determine
offense severity." 5 If neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances
exist, a normal range of time served is indicated." 6 Aggravation extends the

108. Id. at 8-9, 19.
109. UTAH SENTENCE AND RELEASE

GUIDELINES,

supra note 103, at 1131-32.

110. Id. at 1133.
111. See id. at 1138.
112. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-22.5-403 (West Supp. 1993).
113. ENGLISH, supra note 39, at 20.
114. In sentencing, this is called "real offense" sentencing. See Michael H. Tonry, Real
Offense Sentencing: The Model Sentencing and CorrectionsAct,72 J. CRIM. L. &CRIMINOLOGY

1550 (1981).
115. ENGLISH, supra note 39, at 21-22.
116. See id. at 23.
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recommended range and mitigation decreases it. 117
The Utah system is a matrix system, in which offense severity is arranged
along the horizontal axis of a matrix. To obtain the recommended period of
incarceration, one locates the level of the crime's seriousness along one axis
and the criminal history category along the other axis; then one finds the
matrix cell containing the recommendation for that combination." 8 Of two
offenders having equal risk assessment scores, the matrix cell for the armed
robber indicates a higher range of incarceration than the cell for the car thief.
Of two offenders who committed rape, the matrix cell of the rapist with the
longer criminal history indicates a higher range of incarceration than the cell
for the first-offender rapist.119
The parole board may be required to follow the guidelines. If release20
guidelines are mandatory, provision is made for departure from them.
Any departure is limited to certain circumstances and may require the board
to give a statement of justifications.' 2 ' However, not all guidelines are
mandatory. In some jurisdictions the board is allowed to treat the guidelines
as recommendations from which it may freely depart.'1
In either event,
reasons for departure and frequency of departure should be monitored to
determine whether the guidelines require adjustment.
Guidelines may accommodate other policies as long as the legislature has
not proscribed such inclusions. For example, the federal sentencing guidelines
allow departures for offenders who give testimony that convicts another
individual." Guidelines might further serve to relieve prison crowding by
authorizing additional releases when the prison population reaches a certain
level.
B. Benefits of Guidelines 24
Guidelines improve parole decision making because they promote
uniform, principled decisions with sufficient flexibility to deviate when justice
requires a departure. Despite offenders having chosen unjustifiably to intrude
into others' rights, as a group, offenders have a keen sense of justice when
their own rights are concerned. Within the prison culture, a fair amount of
information is exchanged regarding parole decisions. When offenders compare

117. Id. at 21-25.
118. See UTAH SENTENCE AND RELEASE GUIDELINES, supra note 103, at 1138.
119. See id.
120. Id.at 21, 25.
121. Id.
122. Id.at 1129, 1131.
123. Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 5K1.1 (West Supp. 1993).
124. Material for this section is taken from the author's experience as a parole board member
and chairperson involved with votes cast in more than 21,000 actions.
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their parole dates with parole dates of those of others who have committed
similar crimes, they become profoundly disturbed to learn another was treated
more leniently. Guidelines either place like offenders on the same footing or
make known the justifications for differential treatment. Such justifications
include aggravating or mitigating factors and differing risk assessment scores.
Uniformity alone, however, does not result in fair parole decisions. The
guidelines' contribution to principled decisions is most valuable. Parole
decision makers should prepare themselves well before making a decision.
They should know about the crime, how the crime affected the victim, and
what role the offender played. They should understand the pattern of
criminality that preceded the crime and the contribution that the offender's
social history and life's choices made to his criminality. Decision makers
should also inform themselves of the inmate's recent behavior in the institution
and the inmate's needs and responsibilities on returning to the street. They
should be aware of any strong public opinions about the offender, whether the
local prosecutor has targeted the offender's particular crime, and whether the
state has the resources to supervise the inmate adequately. All of this
information significantly affects on the decision maker's view. As a board
member reviews the inmate's file, the process of analysis may proceed like the
following example:
"It was a robbery. . . Oh, that's a terrible, predatory crime. Sixty
months is about right."
"The weapon was a wooden gun ...
forty-eight months is better."

no real threat to life. Maybe

"The victim was an off-duty cop who stomped the heck out of the
offender. How humiliating. But that shouldn't affect his punishment. I'm still at forty-eight months."
"It was a spur-of-the-moment crime... his buddies talked him into
it. The wooden gun happened to be with his son's toys in the car.
This wasn't planned at all. I think I'm down to forty-two months."
"Oh, wait a minute. The rap sheet says this is the third time he's
been convicted for robbery. Even if the facts are similar, this guy
just doesn't get it. I'm up to fifty-four months."
"Wow, look at this. He's been convicted of two discipliners for
strong-arming other inmates. That puts me back at sixty months.
Hmm, the cop he tried to rob is head of the Police Officers Association. He plans to attend the hearing. Sixty-six months?"
Published by Scholar Commons, 1994
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This scenario is not unrealistic. At the same moment a fellow board
member in the next office is arriving at different numbers for the same set
of factors. When the hearing is held, the inmate's adorable toddler wiggles
in mom's arms as she explains to the board how badly she needs the inmate
home. To one board member the child's needs weigh in favor of release;
to another the child's needs go against release because the board member is
convinced the inmate is not a good father.
Guidelines promote principled decisions because they collect all of these
factors, assign a point value to them, and suggest or mandate a result.
Parole decisions reflect consideration of the same factors by all board
members for all cases. If criminal history is significant, all inmates'
criminal histories should be considered. Convictions are more reliable than
arrests, so the guidelines might be designed to consider only convictions.
A clear criminal record should yield a certain benefit, perhaps zero on a risk
assessment score in which high scores indicate high risks. But one to two
felony convictions should add a point, ultimately translating to six more
months in prison. Guidelines assure that all board members give weight to
salient factors in a given case and that, among different cases, the same
factors are salient.
Guidelines further promote principled decisions because, although they
cannot eliminate impermissible factors, they can limit their impact. The
presence of an inmate's family sometimes tugs at the hearts of decision
makers. With guidelines, the limited range of choices discourages wide
swings based on factors not recognized as legitimate.
However, some flexibility is necessary because guidelines cannot be
written to anticipate every circumstance. In extraordinary circumstances,
justice requires deviation from guidelines. A legislature can prevent such
deviations from causing departures from justice by limiting the frequency of
deviations and by requiring a statement of reasons for any deviation from
the guidelines.
Parole release guidelines can contribute enormously to the state's ability
to coordinate and plan criminal justice matters. Such coordination is
necessary if criminal justice components are to avoid working at conflicting
purposes. When various actors in the criminal justice system agree,
guidelines enable the parole component consistently to serve a stated
punishment philosophy. Guidelines enable one to fairly and accurately
predict the amount of time the inmate will serve in prison. This ability
gives prosecutors and defense lawyers a better idea of the actual stakes in
plea negotiations. Predictability further enables planners to make better
decisions about facilities, personnel management, and budget in general.
Finally, guidelines serve important educational purposes. They place
offenders on notice as to what must be done to earn a parole date and give
offenders a means of predicting the outcome of their hearings. Once a
decision is made, the guidelines inform victims, law enforcement, the press,
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss3/6
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and the public regarding the reasons for the outcome.
Parole release guidelines can remedy many of the faults in indeterminate sentencing and, at the same time, retain the best feature of indeterminate sentencing: the ability to base release decisions on prison performance,
the most current information about an offender.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF RELEASE GUIDELINES

A. The Nexus Between Sentencing and Parole
The Constitution affords protection to inmates with regard to sentencing
and release from prison.'1 The Supreme Court's pronouncements on
sentencing and due process are important considerations in setting parole
guidelines. It has observed that the sentencing process must satisfy Fifth
Amendment protection against the deprivation of liberty without due
process.1 26 The Court has identified a number of fundamental rights
compelled by the due process clause respecting, for example, information
used at sentencing, 12729 the ability to address sentencing factors," and use
of prior convictions.'
Most often, however, due process arguments fail to overturn sentences.30
Claims have been rejected in the areas of mandatory sentencing,
reliability of proof,13 1 the impact of a defendant's false statements at

125. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the right to due process by both the
federal and state government, respectively. U.S. CONST. amend. V & XIV, § 1 (stating that a
person shall not be deprived "of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"). The
requirements of due process are flexible and may differ greatly from one context to the next. See
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
126. E.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977).
127. See Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (holding that exclusion of relevant
evidence at a sentencing hearing is a denial of due process); see also Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481
U.S. 393, 398 (1987) (holding that the sentencer in a capital case may not be precluded from
weighing nonstatutory mitigating factors offered by the defendant); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 604 (1978) (holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer
not be precluded from considering any aspect of the defendant's character record as a mitigating
factor in a criminal case).
128. See Gardner, 430 U.S. at 362 (requiring that a defendant facing the death penalty be
allowed to comment on information underlying the sentence).
129. E.g., United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 449 (1972) (holding that convictions which
were obtained in violation of a defendant's right to counsel may not be considered at sentencing).
130. See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 19 (1979) (finding that a Massachusetts statute
mandating suspension of a driver's license for refusing to take a breath analysis test did not
violate due process); see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 (1986) (holding that
due process does not require that possession of a firearm for mandatory sentencing purposes be
proven by clear and convincing evidence).
131. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 252 (1949) (permitting the use in sentencing
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and appointment of counsel.' 33

Similarly, the Supreme Court has articulated constitutional principles
relating to parole. These cases are few, however, probably because the
parole power is frequently created by statute and administered through a
parole board as an outgrowth of the executive's clemency power. The first

major Supreme Court decision affecting parole was Morrissey v. Brewer,3 ' which held that a parolee has a liberty interest in remaining on
parole.13 5 Before parolees can be deprived of that liberty, they must be
afforded due process at the revocation hearing."3 6
The Morrissey decision generated a fear among criminal justice
practitioners that future decisions might impose similar due process
protection upon the parole grant procedure. At one time five of the seven
federal circuit courts of appeals which considered the issue found that
37
minimal due process requirements applied to the granting of parole.1
The Supreme Court addressed the issue in Greenholtz v. Innates of the

of out-of-court affidavits that would not be admissible for the purpose of proving guilt).
132. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 52 (1978) (upholding a sentencing judge's
consideration of a defendant's willingness to lie under oath).
133. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 12 (1989) (holding that the due process does not
require states to appoint counsel to indigent death row inmates who are pursuing post-conviction
remedies), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 827 (1990).
134. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
135. Id. at 482.
136. Id. at 484. The parolee is entitled to a preliminary finding of probable cause. If probable
cause is established at a hearing separate from the revocation hearing, the preliminary hearing
must be held as promptly after the parole violation as possible, near the place the alleged
violation occurred, and conducted by an independent officer. The offender must receive notice
of the preliminary hearing. Additionally, the offender has a right to present evidence, confront
and cross examine witnesses on a limited basis, and obtain a summary of the evidence relied
upon, including conclusions as to probable cause. The revocation hearing must take place within
a reasonable time thereafter, and the parolee must receive notice of this hearing as well. The
parolee has a right to be heard (to present and refute evidence and argue against revocation), a
right to confront and cross examine witnesses on a limited basis, and a right to obtain a summary
of the evidence relied on, including conclusions as to probable cause. Id. at 484-89.
137. See Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex v. Greenholtz, 576 F.2d 1274
(8th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 442 U.S. 1 (1979); Franklin v. Shields, 569 F.2d 784 (4th Cir.), rev'd
in part on other grounds, 569 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1977) (en bane), cert. denied,435 U.S. 1003
(1978); United States ex rel. Richerson v. Wolff, 525 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,425
U.S. 914 (1976); Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
overruled, as recognized by Brandon v. District of Columbia Bd. of Parole, 823 F.2d 644 (D.C.
Cir. 1987); United States ex rel. Johnsonv. Chairman of the N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d
925 (2d Cir.), vacatedas moot sub nom. Regan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974). ContraScott
v. Kentucky Parole Bd., No. 74-1899 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1975), vacated for considerationof
mootness, 429 U.S. 60 (1976) (per curiam); Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278
(5th Cir.) (en bane), vacatedfor considerationof mootness, 414 U.S. 809, dismissed as moot,
501 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1973).
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Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex,138 which established that the
mere existence of a state parole system, absent other factors, does not create
a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole release. 39 However,
the Court acknowledged that the wording of the Nebraska parole statute
created an expectation of release worthy of minimal due process protection."4 Whether particular statutory language gives rise to a liberty
interest in parole continues to be disputed.
Due process jurisprudence relating to both sentencing and parole release
must be considered in tandem.'
Because both sentencing and parole
release are at the end of the criminal justice system, their shared characteristics result in parallel legal analysis. 142 Frequently, sentencing and parole
raise the same policy questions because both involve broad grants of
discretion.'4 3 The Court in Greenholtz stated as follows:
In parole releases, like its siblings probation release and institutional
rehabilitation, few certainties exist. In each case, the decision differs
from the traditional mold of judicial decisionmaking in that the choice
involves a synthesis of record facts and personal observation filtered
through the experience of the decisionmaker and leading to a predictive
judgment as to
what is best both for the individual inmate and for the
44
community.1
Guidelines may be adopted for sentencing or for parole release. Sentencing
guidelines structure the discretion of the judge but not the parole board.
Parole release guidelines structure the discretion of the parole board but
leave the judges' discretion
in place. Some jurisdictions have adopted
14
both.
do
that
guidelines

138. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
139. Id. at 11.
140. Id. at 12.

141. See Andrew Ashworth, StructuringSentencing Discretion, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING
256, 262 (Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds. 1992) (discussing the "intimate
relationship between sentencing and parole").
142. Courts frequently compare sentencing and parole when consideringeither issue. See, e.g.,
State v. Borrell, 482 N.W.2d 883, 891 (Wis. 1992) (stating that "[blecause the parole eligibility
date determination is an integral part of sentencing, we believe that a defendant's due process
rights relating to the parole eligibility date determination are no greater than those associated with

sentencing").
143. Both sentencing and parole decisions employ significant discretion using a broad range
of evidence not allowed in the adjudication of guilt. This discretion of boards and judges may
lead to either unjustified disparity in treatment of offenders or to the flexible, individualized
treatment of offenders for a more just result.

144. 442 U.S. at 8 (footnote omitted).
145. See supra part I.B for an overview of the different state guidelines.
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Although sentencing and parole are similar processes, there are limits
to the efficacy of comparing them. While both serve the purposes of
punislment (retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation), they
cannot do so equally well. One important difference between sentencing and
parole is that setting release at sentencing is an exercise of judicial
discretion, while setting it by a parole board is an exercise of executive
discretion. Also, parole decision makers have more information available
to them than do judges at sentencing. Judges have information up to the
point of conviction, but parole boards also know how the offenders
responded to prison, whether the offenders' resolve to remain offense-free
survived the first offer of marijuana, whether the offenders have availed
themselves of treatment programs, and the offenders' outlook on their
46
futures. 1
B. Due ProcessJurisprudence
1. Theories
Presently, the United States Supreme Court favors the entitlement
theory of due process analysis, which states that procedural due process
protection is limited to rights found in the text of the federal constitution and
rights created by state and federal law. 47 Once the Court determines that
a procedural due process right exists, it then determines what process is due.
Various developments have occurred under this entitlement analysis.
When claims are based on creation of a liberty interest by a state or federal
statute or practice, the Supreme Court has focused on the nature of the
language or practice. For cases in which a protectible liberty interest is
claimed, the Supreme Court has introduced 48 and developed'49 a balanc146. Another important difference in the two processes is that determining release dates at
sentencing better serves the goal of retribution by focusing exclusively on the offenders' past
behavior. It better serves the goal of deterrence by meting a speedier consequence for deviant
behavior. However, delaying the determination of release dates until the offenders have served
part of their sentences promotes the goal of incapacitation because the inmates' prison records
can inform decision makers about the risk of recidivism. Also, the delay promotes the goal of
rehabilitation because the prison has had an opportunity to address the inmates' needs and the
inmates have had opportunities to rehabilitate themselves.
147. For a discussion of positivist or formal entitlement theory, see Wallace v. Robinson, 940
F.2d 243, 246-49 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1563 (1992), and Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., Some Confisions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and ConstitutionalRemedies, 93
COLUM. L. REv. 309 (1993).
148. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970) (finding that the entitlement to
procedural due process protection is influenced, among other factors, by the extent to which a
person will be "condemned to suffer a grievous loss" (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm.
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951))).
149. Early cases had merely instructed that courts look not to the weight but to the nature of
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ing test that allows a court to give great deference to state interests. The
factors to be considered under this test are as follows:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 150
If the state's interests outweigh the inmate's interest, then no liberty interest
exists and the Due Process Clause does not come into play.
The presence or absence of mandatory language or standards governs
entitlement theory application. Under the theory, the Supreme Court held
that mandatory language in a state parole statute created a liberty interest
protected by minimal due process.151 The Supreme Court has also held
that frequent grants of commutation, absent underlying mandatory language,
does not create a liberty interest for future applicants, 152 that statutes and
regulations which establish procedures for confining an inmate to administrative segregation can create a protected liberty interest solely because of the
mandatory language,"' and that visiting regulations which do not mandate
an outcome create no liberty interest. 54 The end of this section will
discuss cases that consider whether particular statutory language creates a
liberty interest in parole.
Relatively fewer Supreme Court cases suggest that a liberty interest
protected by due process derives from the quantum or quality of the interest
at stake. However, this analysis is more likely to lead to a protected liberty
interest than is the entitlement theory analysis. In Vitek v. Jones55 the
Court held that due process applied to the transfer of an inmate to a mental57
56
In Washington v. Harper
facility pursuant to a Nebraska statute.
it held due process applied when a state regulation allowed forced medica-

the interest. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972).
150. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
151. Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 381 (1987) (finding that the Montana parole
statute's use of mandatory language created a protected liberty interest); Greenholtz v. Inmates
of the Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979) (finding that the Nebraska
parole statute's use of mandatory language created a protected liberty interest).
152. Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 467 (1981).
153. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983).
154. Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 464-65 (1989).
155. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
156. Id. at 487-88 (citing NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-180(1) (1976) (current version 1987)).
157. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
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tion of a mentally ill inmate.158 In both cases the Court first used entitlement analysis to find that the state had created a liberty interest subject to
due process protection." 9 Inexplicably, the Court went further in both
cases and additionally found that due process protection applies independently of the state-created right. 1 The Court's determination that confinement in a mental hospital and treatment for mental illness are "qualitatively"
different from the usual consequences of criminal confinement supported the
acknowledgement of substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 161 The Vitek Court concluded that the stigma and unjustified
intrusion on personal security which resulted from confinement in a mental
hospital warranted due process protection. 6 It is unknown whether these
cases reflect the Court's attitude toward mental health cases in particular or
whether the Court contrasts these decisions with entitlement analysis by
finding substantive due process when the interest at stake is qualitatively

significant.
Currently, only slight support exists for a final theory: the "grievous
loss" theory. This theory is the one most likely to result in the Court
finding a protected liberty interest. Grievous loss analysis is based on the
premise that people have "cardinal unalienable rights" which may or may
not appear in the text of statutes or the Constitution. 163 When the state
abridges one of these rights and citizens suffer a "grievous loss" as a result,
due process protection applies.' 6 The focus under this theory is on the
purpose underlying the Due Process Clause: to limit the power of the
sovereign to infringe on the liberty of citizens. Initially, the Supreme Court
invoked due process when any person would be "condemned to suffer
grievous loss of any kind" 1' and even suggested that the "stigma and

158. Id. at 221-22.
159. The Supreme Court in Vitek found that a statute created an objective expectation that "a
prisoner would not be transferred unless he suffered from a mental disease or defect that could
not be adequately treated in the prison." 445 U.S. at 490. The Court in Washington v. Harper
found that a prisoner had "a right to be free from the arbitrary administration of antipsychotic
medication." 494 U.S. at 221.
160. The Court in Vitek stated that "[t]he issue is whether after a conviction for robbery, (the
prisoner] retained a residuum of liberty that would be infringed by a transfer to a mental hospital
without complying with the minimum requirements of due process." 445 U.S. at 491. The Court

answered in the affirmative. Id. at 493. In Washington the Court stated, "We have no doubt that,
in addition to the liberty interest created by the State's Policy, respondent possesses a significant
liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due
Process Clause. ..

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

."

494 U.S. at 221.

Vitek, 445 U.S. at 493.
Id. at 492-93.
See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 231.
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter,
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hardships of a criminal conviction" might be more grievous than property
loss.' 66 The Court weakened the protection provided by the "grievous
loss" analysis when it introduced the notion of balancing the loss against the
state's interest. 67 Most damaging for inmate litigants was the Court's
pronouncement in 1976 that it rejected "the notion that any grievous loss
visited upon a person by the State is sufficient to invoke the procedural
protection of the Due Process Clause." ' 68 Citing this language, the Court
frequently finds that inmates have no protected liberty interest at stake.'6 9
Dissenters, however, continue to argue that the recent, more restrictive
cases ignore the broad foundations of earlier due process cases.

70

2. Cases Consideringa Liberty Interest in
Sentencing Under Guidelines
In approximately one dozen or more states with sentencing (not parole
release) guideline experience, few have addressed claims that their
guidelines create a liberty interest protected by due process. Those
considering the argument offer little succor to defendants claiming an
entitlement to greater due process protection. The Minnesota Court of
Appeals decided a case wherein the inmate argued at his sentencing that he
should be released under the newly adopted sentencing guidelines rather than
under the parole system in place. " The court found that Minnesota's
sentencing guidelines contained neither the "particularized substantive
standards to guide parole decisions nor... mandatory language" sufficient
to create a protectible liberty interest. 7 Similarly, an appellate court in
Florida rejected a defendant's argument that the sentencing guidelines
enhanced his liberty interest to the extent that traditional procedures no

J., concurring).
166. Id.
167. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970), quoted in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
168. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224 (emphasis in original), quoted in Jago v. Van Curen, 454
U.S. 14, 17 (1981).
169. See, e.g., Jago, 454 U.S. at 17 (holding that a liberty interest in parole did not arise from
"mutually explicit understandings" between the prisoner and parole authority).
170. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460,483 (1983) ("In [Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
(1974)], the Court squarely held that every prisoner retains a significant residuum of constitutionally protected liberty following his incarceration.. . . The source of the liberty recognized in
Wolff is not state law, nor even the Constitution itself.") (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Olim
v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 251 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("An inmate's liberty
interest is not limited to whatever a State chooses to bestow upon him.").
171. Powell v. Erickson, No. C5-87-1863, 1988 WL 19354 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 1988).
172. Id. at *3.
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The court held that
longer provided adequate due process protection."
judges retained the discretion to exceed the range recommended in the
guidelines. 74
The case law on federal sentencing guidelines is more fully developed
than the case law on state sentencing guidelines. Concern over broad
disparity in federal sentencing resulted in the abolition of parole and, later,
passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 which created the United
States Sentencing Commission. 75 That Act charged the Commission with
the task of implementing sentencing guidelines for federal crimes. 76
Since their inception, the federal sentencing guidelines have faced many
challenges, most of which were settled in the landmark case of Mistretta v.
United States.'" Although the issue was raised in Mistretta, the Court did
not rule on whether sentencing under the federal sentencing guidelines
violates the Due Process Clause.
In the absence of such a ruling, federal circuits have considered
substantive and procedural due process challenges to the federal guidelines.
Circuit courts have been unwilling to find that sentencing guidelines violate
the Due Process Clause merely because the guidelines circumscribe the

discretion of the judge,17 nor have the courts adopted the view that
offenders have a protected right to present mitigating evidence at non-capital
sentencing hearings.' 79 These arguments'have been rejected on several

173. See Mincey v. State, 460 So. 2d 396 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
174. Id. at 397.
175. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court offered the following
explanation of how these developments arose:
Approximately a century ago, a reform movement asserting that the purpose of
incarceration. . . should be rehabilitation of the offender, dramatically altered the
approach to sentencing. A fundamental proposal of this movement was a flexible
sentencing system permitting judges and correctionalpersonnel, particularly the latter,
to set the release date of prisoners according to informed judgments concerning their
potential for, or actual, rehabilitation and their likely recidivism ...
. . . Thus it is that today the extent of a federal prisoner's confinement is initially
determined by the sentencing judge, who selects a term within an often broad, congressionally prescribed range; release on parole is then available on review by the United States
Parole Commission, which, as a general rule, may conditionally release a prisoner any time
after he serves one-third of the judicially fixed term.
United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
176. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1988).
177. 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (holding that the participation of federal judges on the sentencing
commission, the joint exercise of authority with non-judges, and the presidential appointment of
these judges did not violate the separation of powers and that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
was not an excessive delegation of legislative authority).
178. E.g., United States v. Vizcaino, 870 F.2d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Frank,
864 F.2d 992, 1008-09 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1095 (1989).
179. E.g., United States v. White, 869 F.2d 822, 825 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
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grounds. Some courts find that a liberty interest in individualized sentencing is inconsistent with the goals of retribution and deterrence'8 0 or cite
congressional power to completely divest courts of sentencing discretion.'8 ' One court pointed out that the guidelines do not supplant the
judgments of tribunals because federal judges retain some discretion."n
Independent of those arguments is the claim posed by offenders who
fare better under the guidelines than under the former parole scheme. These
offenders argue that they are entitled to a release date within the range of
terms produced by application of the federal sentencing guidelines. In
United States v. Restrepo' 3 the Ninth Circuit considered whether using the
preponderance of the evidence standard to determine the existence of
enhancing factors under the Sentencing Reform Act violates due process. 11 The defendant argued that the mandatory language of the statute
and guidelines gave him a constitutionally protected expectation of receiving
the term required by application of the guidelines. He further claimed that,
because the deprivation of his liberty depended on the reliability of factual
conclusions necessary for application of the guidelines, due process required
that those determinations be made beyond a reasonable doubt. '
The
court declared that an offender had a protected interest at sentencing even
before the guidelines were enacted8 6 and, after passage of the Sentencing
Reform Act, the offender has nothing more than an interest in accurate
application of the guidelines.1'7 Although the guidelines give a predetermined effect to traditional sentencing factors, the court added, the guidelines
do not alter the maximum penalty for the crime committed.' 8 The
majority held that due process does not require a standard of proof higher
than preponderance of the evidence. 8 9
Judge Pregerson and Judge Norris dissented, arguing that the offender's
right to a sentence less than the statutory maximum was greater than a mere
right to have the guidelines accurately applied. ' 90 Rather, in this case, the
guidelines created a constitutionally protected expectation of receiving

490 U.S. 112, and cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1001 (1989).
180. E.g., Frank, 864 F.2d at 1009-10; accord Vizcaino, 870 F.2d at 55-56.
181. E.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 364; White, 869 F.2d at 825.
182. United States v. Brittman, 872 F.2d 827, 828 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 865
(1989).
183. 946 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1991) (en bane), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1564 (1992).
184. Restrepo, 946 F.2d at 655.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 657.
187. Id. at 659.
188. Id.
189. Restrepo, 946 F.2d at 661.
190. Id. at 663 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
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twenty-seven to thirty-three months for the committed crime.' 9 Because
proof of additional facts would mandate an additional fourteen to eighteen
months, Judge Pregerson argued further that proof beyond a reasonable
doubt was required.'"
Dicta in United States v. Vizcaino'" lends slight support for the
proposition that the guidelines create a liberty interest. In response to
Vizcaino's procedural due process claim, the court initially found that the
offender had a liberty interest in -avoiding future incarceration.' 19 The
court stated that "Supreme Court decisions rejecting procedural due process
challenges to sentences hold only that there is no right to avoid serving a
valid sentence or to have a particular sentence."" 9 The Second Circuit
found that the process outlined in the guidelines provided satisfactory
procedural safeguards. 196 Both Vizcaino and Restrepo articulate a very
limited right - the right to have one's sentence determined by a process
with satisfactory procedural safeguards.
Lastly, Justice Souter's dissent in Burns v. United States19' supports
the view that the guidelines create a liberty interest in sentencing. 19 The
majority in Burns held that a district court may not sua sponte depart
upward from the guideline range without giving reasonable notice to the
parties that it is considering such a departure.199 This holding is based on
construction of the statute rather than the Due Process Clause. 2" In
criticizing the majority's statutory construction, the dissent assumes that a
liberty interest exists and concludes that the process due does not require
notice."' Souter's discussion of the nature of the liberty interest is
particularly interesting. He first compared the Sentencing Reform Act with
that portion of Greenholtz which held that the language mandating parole
release, unless certain criteria were met, created a constitutionally protected
interest30 He continued with: "I therefore conclude that a defendant

191. Id.
192. Id. at 663-64.
193. 870 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1989).
194. Id. at 56.
195. Id. (citations omitted).
196. Id.
197. 111 S. Ct. 2182 (1991).
198. Id. at 2196 (Souter, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 2186.
200. Id. at 2187 ("[W]ere we to read Rule 32 to dispense with notice, we would then have to
confront the serious question whether notice in this setting is mandated by the Due Process
Clause.").
201. Id. at 2188-97 (Souter, J., dissenting).
202. Burns, 111 S. Ct. at 2191 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of the
Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979)).
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enjoys an expectation subject to due process protection that he will receive
a sentence within the presumptively applicable range in the absence of
grounds defined by the Act as justifying departure." 3
Applying the
balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge,2' Souter concluded that the
process due does not include the right to notice of the sentencing judge's
intent to make a sua sponte upward departure. 5
The United States Supreme Court has made no definitive finding
regarding whether sentencing guidelines at the federal level create a liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause. The best case that can be
made rests on the dicta and dissents discussed above.
3. Cases Considering a Liberty Interest in Parolein General
Before the Supreme Court decided Greenholtz v. Inmates of the
Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex,' circuit courts were split on
whether inmates had a liberty interest in parole consideration.1w The
District of Columbia Circuit held that federal prisoners were entitled to
receive a statement of reasons for denial of parole." ° This decision rested
on a broad finding of due process entitlement in parole consideration.'
Similarly, the New York Board held that state prisoners were entitled to0
21
know why they were denied parole under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Courts based their decisions on the due process analysis in Morrissey v.
Brewer. 1 However, most courts considered that the right to maintain
conditional freedom predominated over the mere anticipation or hope of
freedom.21 2 The most far-reaching of these decisions, Franklin v.
Shields," 3 held that due process guaranteed Virginia inmates the following

203. Id. at 2192.
204. For a discussion of the balancing test, see supra note 151 and accompanying text.
205. Burns, 111 S. Ct. at 2193.
206. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
207. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
208. See Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1974), overruled,
as recognizedby Brandon v. District of Columbia Bd. of Parole, 823 F.2d 644 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
209. Id. at 1278.
210. United States ex rel. Johnsonv. Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d
Cir.), vacatedasmoot sub nom. Reganv. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974); see also United States
ex rel. Richerson v. Wolff, 525 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 914 (1976)
(holding that at a minimum, due process-required that reasons for denying parole be given).
211. 408 U.S. 471 (1972). For a discussionof the Morrisseydecision, see supra notes 135-38
and accompanying text.
212. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 n.8 (1972) (quoting United States ex rel.
Bey v. Connecticut, 443 F.2d 1079, 1086 (2d Cir.), vacated, 404 U.S. 879 (1971)).
213. 569 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1977), aff'd inpart& rev'd inpartpercuriam, 569 F.2d 800 (4th
Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1003 (1978).
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rights: the right to have the parole board publish its criteria for parole, the
right to notice and a hearing (but not counsel), the right to access their files,
the right to present evidence in favor of parole, and the right to require that
the board provide prisoners with a written statement of its reasons for
denying parole. 1 4 The majority opinion was overturned in part when the
court, sitting en banc, reconsidered." 5 Reversing most of the majority's
opinion, the court held that the only explicit constitutional requisite
concerning parole is that the decision maker must furnish a prisoner with
reasons for denial of parole.2 16 The Fourth Circuit also stated, "In
adopting written guidelines for the granting of parole the Board has
exhibited commendable concern for the rights of the prisoners and we find
it unnecessary to presently consider whether its efforts along this line are
constitutionally required."217 Although the en bane court disagreed as to
what process was due, it did not overturn the majority's determination that
Virginia's parole statute conferred on the prisoner an interest in liberty, nor
did it overturn the holding that the due process clause is applicable to parole
release proceedings.2 18
State courts came to similar conclusions during this pre-Greenholtz
period. In State ex rel. Taylor v. Schoen219 the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that parole release decisions were subject to due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
Ultimately, the Taylor court
found that the process provided was adequate. 1
The United State Supreme Court decided the landmark case of
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal & Correctional CompleiP
in 1979. In Greenholtz Nebraska inmates alleged violations of due process
in the parole board's consideration of inmates' suitability for parole.
Certiorari was granted to resolve the conflict among circuits as to the
process due in parole proceedings. Although Nebraska's procedures were
ultimately vindicated, two major holdings emerged from the case: (1) The
mere presence of a state parole system does not create a constitutionally
protected right, and (2) the particular language of the Nebraska parole

214. Franklin, 569 F.2d at 791-97.
215. See id. at 800.
216. Id. at 801.
217. Id. at 800.
218. See id. at 800-01. The mainstream interpretation of Franklinis that, when process is due
in parole proceedings, no more than a statement of reasons for denial is required. See Bloodgood
v. Garraghty, 783 F.2d 470, 473 (4th Cir. 1986).
219. 273 N.W.2d 612 (Minn. 1978) (en banc).
220. Id. at 617. The parole board's decision was based on permissive guidelines which were
subsequently replaced with mandatory guidelines in 1980. Id. at 619 n.8.
221. Id. at 617.
222. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
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statute created a liberty interest.'
The Court began from the premise that government deprivation of a
liberty or property interest requires due process protection. To the extent
circuits finding a liberty interest relied on Morrissey, the Greenholtz Court
clarified that the differences between parole grant and parole revocation
defeat that analogy, stating that "the general interest asserted here is no
more substantial than the inmate's hope that he will not be transferred to
another prison, a hope which is not protected by due process."I
In finding a liberty interest, the majority focused on the mandatory
language of Nebraska's statute. It found that "shall" in combination with
"unless," created an expectancy of parole that can be denied only in
accordance with due process principles.'
A four-justice minority,
however, argued that a liberty interest exists even without mandatory
language. Justice Powell argued that prisoners are justified in expecting that
parole will be granted fairly and according to law whenever the state's
enunciated standards are met, regardless of whether the word "shall" is
used.'
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens,
argued that "all prisoners potentially eligible for parole have a liberty
interest of which they may not be deprived without due process.""n
Since Greenholtz, courts have examined state parole systems to
determine whether the respective parole consideration schemes place such
limitations on the state's discretion so as to create a constitutionally
protected liberty interest. In 1987 the Supreme Court again considered the
issue in Board of Pardons v. Allen,' this time addressing whether
inmates in the Montana system had a protected liberty interest in parole
release. Once again persuaded by substantive predicates and mandatory

223. Id. at 11-12. The statute contained these provisions:
Whenever the Board of Parole considers the release of a committed offender who is
eligible for release on parole, it shall order his release unless it is of the opinion that
his release should be deferred because:
(a) There is a substantial risk that he will not conform to the conditions of parole;
(b) His release would depreciate the seriousness of his crime or promote disrespect
for law;
(c)His release would have a substantially adverse effect on institutional discipline; or
(d) His continued correctional treatment, medical care, or vocational or other training
in the facility will substantially enhance his capacity to lead a law-abiding life when
released at a later date.
Id. at 11 (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1,114(1) (1976) (current version 1987)).
224. 442 U.S. at 11 (citations omitted). In the remainder of the majority opinion, the Court
found that the procedures provided by the state of Nebraska accorded the process due. Id. at 16.
225. Id. at 11-12.
226. Id. at 19 (Powell, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
227. Id. at 22 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original).
228. 482 U.S. 369 (1987).
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language in the statute, the Court held Montana had created a protected
liberty interest. 9 The Court seemingly adhered to the notion that a
statute must create a constitutionally protected liberty interest for due
process protection to apply to parole.? 0 Justice O'Connor, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, found the Court's approach
inconsistent with previous liberty interest jurisprudence.2'1
Justice
O'Connor stated, "Although paying lipservice to the principle that a statute
creates an entitlement sufficient to trigger due process protections only when
the decisionmakers' discretion is limited by standards, the Court today
utterly fails to consider whether the purported 'standards' meaningfully
constrain the discretion of state officials. " 2 She concluded that the
majority "abandoned the essential inquiry in determining whether a statute
creates a liberty interest" and, therefore, the majority no longer required
particularized standards which impose real limits on the discretion of
3
decision makers.
4. Language Which Creates an Entitlement
Since Greenholtz state and federal courts have disagreed as to what
language is sufficient to create an entitlement protected by due process. In
Board of Pardons v. Allen, Justice Brennan noted that federal appellate
courts' decisions fall into four categories. 4 In the first category of
decisions, courts find a liberty interest "[w]hen statutes or regulatory
provisions are phrased in mandatory terms or explicitly create a presumption
of release."I' It is fairly well settled that explicit mandatory language
creates a liberty interest. By 1986 circuit courts had found that statutes or

229. Id. at 381. The relevant part of the statute provided:
Prisoners eligible for parole. (1) Subject to the following restrictions, the board shall
release on parole

. . .

any person confined in the Montana state prison or the

women's correction center... when in its opinion there is reasonable probability that
the prisoner can be released without detriment to the prisoner or to the community[.]
(2) A parole shall be ordered only for the best interests of society and not as an award of
clemency or a reduction of the sentence or pardon. A prisoner shall be placed on parole
only when the board believes that he is able and willing to fulfill the obligations of a lawabiding citizen.
Id. at 376-77 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-201 (1985) (emphasis added) (current
amended version 1993)).
230. See id. at 381.
231. See id. at 385 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 384 (emphasis in original).
233. Allen, 482 U.S. at 385.
234. Id. at 378-80 n.10.
235. Id. at 379 n.10.
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regulations of Missouri, 6 Tennessee,1 7 and Arkansas2 8 each created
a liberty interest in parole. In the Tennessee and the Arkansas cases, the
federal courts found that, while the state statute did not create a liberty
interest, language in an agency rule sufficiently limited discretion to create
an expectation of release. 9 No state court decisions have found such
liberty interests.
In the second category, courts hold that "statutes or regulations that
provide that a parole board 'may' release an inmate on parole do not give
rise to a protected liberty interest."'24 Explicitly permissive language does
not create a liberty interest. Inmates argued unsuccessfully that parole
systems in Ohio,241 Oklahoma,24 Colorado,243 New Mexico, 2" and

236. Williams v. Missouri Bd. of Probation & Parole, 661 F.2d 697,698 (8th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 993 (1982). At the time of the decision, a Missouri statute provided: "When
in its opinion there is reasonable probability that the prisoner can be released without detriment
to the community or to himself, the board shall release on parole any person confined in any
correctional institution administered by state authorities. . . ." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 549.261
(Vernon 1980) (emphasis added). The Board had also adopted guidelines to structure its
decisions.
The state legislature subsequently amended this statute, thereby overruling Williams by
replacing the mandatory language with discretionary language. See Mo. ANN. STAT. §
217.690(1) (Vernon Supp. 1993) ("When in its opinion there is a reasonable probability that an
offender of a correctional facility can be released without detriment to the community or to
himself, the board may in its discretionrelease or parole such person, except where otherwise
prohibited by law." (emphasis added)).
237. Mayes v. Trammell, 751 F.2d 175, 179 (6th Cir. 1984), supersededby rule as stated in
Wright v. Trammell, 810 F.2d 589 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
238. Parker v. Corrothers, 750 F.2d 653, 661 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that Parole Board
Regulation § 3.09, which provided "that when the Board 'considers the first release' of an
[eligible] inmate, it is the 'policy of the Board to order ... release' unless one or more of nine
substantive reasons for deferral applies," created a liberty interest).
239. Mayes, 751 F.2d at 179; Parker,750 F.2d at 661.
240. Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 379 n.10 (1987).
241. Wagner v. Gilligan, 609 F.2d 866, 867 (6th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). The relevant Ohio
statute allows the parole board to grant parole if "in its judgment there is a reasonable ground
to believe" that doing so "would further the interests of justice and be consistent with the welfare
and security of society." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.03 (Anderson 1993).
242. Shirley v. Chestnut, 603 F.2d 805, 806 (10th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). The Oklahoma
statute authorizes the parole board to recommend parole to the Governor, who may then grant
parole upon this recommendation. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 332.2, 354 (West 1991 & Supp.
1994).
243. Schuemann v. Colorado State Bd. of Adult Parole, 624 F.2d 172, 174 & n.2 (10th Cir.
1980) (explaining that although the Colorado scheme provided inmates with notification of factors
to be considered in the parole grant decision, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-2-201(4)(a) (West
1978) (current version West 1986) provided that the Board "may" release the inmate, but it is
not required to do so, even when statutory requirements are met).
244. Candelaria v. Griffin, 641 F.2d 868, 869 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (quoting N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-21-10(A) (Michie 1978) (repealed 1980), which had provided that "tihe board
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Mississippi created a liberty interest, but circuit courts in each case
found that broad, permissive language left parole to the discretion of parole
boards without creating an expectation of release protected by due process.
Additionally, a state legislature may change its parole statute to
eliminate the liberty interest. The Missouri legislature redrafted the statute
which had been found to create a liberty interest, replacing mandatory
language with permissive language.246 Challenged anew, the Eighth
Circuit found that the statute did not create a liberty interest.247
With one exception, state courts are in accord. Permissive language in
statutes in Kansas,"4 Idaho, 9 and Mississippi 0 have been found not
to create a liberty interest. In 1990 the Utah Court of Appeals found that
the permissive language in Utah's statute did not create a liberty interest. 51s However, a more recent state supreme court decision held other-

may release on parole any person confined in any correctional institution... when the prisoner
gives evidence of having secured gainful employment or satisfactory evidence of self-support, and
the board finds in its opinion the prisoner can be released without detriment to himself or to the
community").
245. Irving v. Thigpen, 732 F.2d 1215, 1217 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). The Mississippi
statute provides that "[e]very prisoner... whose record of conduct shows that such prisoner has
observed the rules of the Penitentiary, and who has served [specified minimum percentages of
sentences], may be released on parole." Miss. CODE ANN. § 47-7-3 (1993). The Board is to
order parole "only for the best interest of society ... when the board believes that [a prisoner]
is able and willing to fulfill the obligations of a law-abiding citizen." Id. § 47-7-17, quoted in
Irving, 732 F.2d at 1217.
246. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
247. Gale v. Moore, 763 F.2d 341, 343 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam).
248. Gilmore v. Kansas Parole Bd., 756 P.2d 410, 414 (Kan.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 930
(1988) (holding that KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3717(e) (Supp. 1987), which provided that "the
Kansas parole board shall have the power to release on parole those persons confined in
institutions who are eligible for parole when, in the opinion of the board, there is reasonable
probability that such persons can be released without detriment to the community or themselves"
created no liberty interest) (alteration in original). Section 22-3717 has been substantially
amended, effective July 1, 1993. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 27-3717 (Supp. 1993).
249. Izatt v. State, 661 P.2d 763,766 (Idaho 1983) (holding that no liberty interest was created
by the Idaho parole statute). The relevant statute provides in part:
A parole shall be ordered only for the best interests of society. . . , not as a reward
of clemency and it shall not be considered to be a reduction of sentence or a pardon.
A prisoner shall be placed on parole only when arrangements have been made for his
proper employment or maintenance and care, and when the commission believes the
prisoner is able and willing to fulfill the obligations of a law-abiding citizen.
IDAHO CODE § 20-223(c) (Supp. 1993).
250. Harden v. State, 547 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Miss. 1989) (agreeing with Irving v. Thigpen,
732 F.2d 1215 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam), that in Mississippi a prisoner has no liberty interest
in parole because of the discretionary language of its parole statutes).
251. Hatch v. Deland, 790 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the relevant Utah
statute created no liberty interest). The statute provides that "[t]he Board of Pardons may ...
parole any offender... committed to a penal or correctional facility under the jurisdiction of the
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wise. In Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons"2 the court acknowledged that
Utah's statute did not contain statutory language that limited the board's
discretion. Therefore, no federally protected liberty interest existed.353
Facing settled law holding that discretionary parole statutes establish no
protected liberty interest, the Utah Supreme Court relied on the Utah
Constitution to hold that the judiciary had inherent authority to review
parole board decisions to assure that inmates had not been denied due
process3541 The court
partly based its holding on Utah's indeterminate
5
sentencing scheme. 5
The third class of cases involved statutes stating that an offender "shall
not be released unless or shall be released only when certain conditions are
met."" Courts are divided regarding whether this language that restricts
authority in the absence of a particular condition creates a liberty interest,
but most courts do not find that a liberty interest has been created. Among
statutes that do not create a liberty interest are those in Alabama, 7
Vermont,2 8 North Dakota, 2 9 and Indiana. 260
Even when combined

Department of Corrections for a felony or class A misdemeanor. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-9(1)
(Supp. 1993).
Hatch v. Deland has recently been abrogated by the Utah Supreme Court in Labrum v.
Utah State Board of Pardons, No. 920222, 1993 WL 512821, at *10 (Utah Dec. 6, 1993), to the
extent it is contrary to the holding of Foote v. Utah Boardof Pardons, discussed infra notes 25254.
252. 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991).
253. Id. (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S.
1 (1979)).
254. Id. at 735.
255. See id.
256. Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 379 n.10 (1987) (emphasis in original).
257. Thomas v. Sellers, 691 F.2d 487, 488 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). Section 15-22-26
of the Alabama statute states:
No prisoner shall be released on parole merely as a reward for good conduct or
efficient performance of duties assigned in prison, but only if the board of pardons
and paroles is of the opinion that there is reasonably probability that.., he will live
and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not incompatible
with the welfare of society.
ALA. CODE § 15-22-26 (1982).
258. Berard v. State of Vt. Parole Ed., 730 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1984). The Vermont statute
states in part:
After an inmate has served the minimum term of his sentence... less any reductions
for good behavior. . . , he shall be released on parole by the written order of the
parole board if the board determines there is a reasonable probability that the inmate
can be released without detriment to the community or to himself.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 501 (1986).
259. Pattenv. North Dakota Parole Bd., 783 F.2d 140, 142 (8th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). The
North Dakota statute stated:
No parole shall be granted to any person confined in the penitentiary or state farm
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with guidelines, statutes in Florida2 61 and New Yor 2 62 were also held

not to create liberty interests. Likewise, state courts construing similar
language have found no liberty interest created.263
The only third-category case to hold that a liberty interest was created
is United States ex rel. Scott v. Illinois Parole & Pardon Board,"4 when

unless ... [hie has maintained a good record at the penitentiary or state farm for a
reasonable period ... and the board is convinced that the applicant will conform to
all the rules and regulations adopted by said board ....
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-59-07 (1985). This section was amended to replace the word "shall"
with the word "may" in 1991. See id. § 12-59-07 (Supp. 1993).
260. Huggins v. Isenbarger, 798 F.2d 203, 205 (7th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). The relevant
Indiana statute provides that "[t]he parole board may not parole a person if it determines that
there is substantial reason to believe that the person: (1)
[w]ill engage in further specified criminal
activity; or (2) [w]ill not conform to appropriate specified conditions of parole." IND. CODE ANN.
§ 11-13-3-30) (Bums 1992).
261. Staton v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 686, 687 (5th Cir. Unit B), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 909
(1982). The Florida statute provides:
No person shall be placed on parole until and unless the commission finds that there
is reasonable probability that, if he is placed on parole, he will live and conduct
himself as a respectable and law-abiding person and that his release will be
compatible with his own welfare and the welfare of society.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 947.18 (Harrison 1991). Tentative release dates ("presumptive" dates)
are set by a matrix guideline. Id. § 947-172.
262. Boothe v. Hammock, 605 F.2d 661, 664 (2d Cir. 1979). The applicable New York
statute states:
Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for good
conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if
there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible
with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as
to undermine respect for law.
N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 259-i(2)(c) (McKinney 1993). Further, the Board must establish and use
written guidelines to aid in their decisions. Id. § 259-c(4).
263. Fletcher v. Casson, 1988 WL 32020 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 23, 1988). The court held
that no liberty interest was created by DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4347(c) (1987), which provided
that the board "may" parole when it is reasonably probable that no detriment will come to the
community and parole supervision is in the best interest of society and the inmate. The statute
continued, "A parole shall be ordered only in the best interest of society, not as an award of
clemency, and shall not be considered as a reduction of sentence or pardon. A person shall be
placed on parole only when the Board believes that he is able and willing to fulfill the obligations
of a law-abiding citizen." Id.
264. 669 F.2d 1185, 1188 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1048 (1982) (per curiam). The
Illinois statute provides:
The Board shall not parole a person eligible for parole if it determines that: (1)
there
is a substantial risk that he will not conform to reasonable conditions of parole; or (2)
his release at that time would deprecate the seriousness of his offense or promote
disrespect for the law; or (3) his release would have a substantially adverse effect on
institutional discipline.
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the court reasoned that the "shall not/if" language of the Illinois statute
mirrored Nebraska's "shall/unless" statute.2"
In the fourth class of cases, courts examined statutes or regulatory
parole-release schemes that used "elaborate and explicit guidelines to
structure the exercise of discretion."'
Courts generally find that these
detailed schemes create a liberty interest. For example, the Third Circuit
held that a liberty interest existed in a Delaware work-release program with
a three-tiered selection process. 67 In addition, the Eighth Circuit remanded a case to determine whether particularized standards gave rise to a liberty
interest in a sex offender program in Missouri.2 68 Dace v. Mickelson,26 9
a particularly interesting fourth-category case, involved a South Dakota
prisoner who sued the parole board for failing to give reasons for denying
his parole. In a panel decision, Circuit Judge Arnold, writing for the
majority, found no right to parole in the state parole statute. However, he
found that an administrative regulation created a right to parole.2 0 This
decision was overruled by an en banc court on rehearing.2 1 The court
used the two-part test it had enunciated in Parker v. Corrothers2 2 and
asked whether the state had placed "substantive limitations on official discretion."273 The court characterized substantive limitations as objective and
measurable criteria, contrasting them with subjective criteria. 4 The court
never determined whether the criteria at issue were "substantive limitations," stating:

730 ILL. STAT. ANN. 5/3-3-5(c) (West 1992).
265. Scott, 669 F.2d at 1188 (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional
Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979)).
266. Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 379-80 n.10 (1987).
267. Winsett v. McGinnes, 617 F.2d 996, 1007 (3d Cir. 1980) (en bane), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1093 (1981). The court's rationale rested heavily on the detailed nature of the regulation.
Contra Baumann v. Arizona Dep't of Corrections, 754 F.2d 841 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that
a prisoner did not have a protected liberty interest in custodial release on work furlough).
268. Green v. Black, 755 F.2d 687, 688 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam). The Eighth Circuit
appears willing to find particularized standards which implicate due process. See, e.g., Maggard
v. Wyrick, 800 F.2d 195, 198 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1068 (1987) (extending
the inquiry of whether a prisoner has a protected liberty interest in parole past the statutory
language to the existence or non-existence of particularized standards).
269. 797 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1986), vacated, 816 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1987) (en bane).
270. 797 F.2d at 578.
271. Mickelson, 816 F.2d 1277.
272. 750 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1984). The two-part test asks the following questions: (1)
ID]oes
the statute contain particularized substantive standards or criteria which significantly guide parole
decisions; and (2) does the statute use mandatory language similar in substance or form to the
Nebraska statute's language at issue in Greenholtz? Id. at 656.
273. Mickelson, 816 F.2d at 1279.
274. Id. at 1280.
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Even if substantive guidelines are to be considered, however, unless
these guidelines limit the parole board's discretion to release the
prisoner, no liberty interest in parole is established... [For a state to
create aprotectibleliberty interest the statute or regulationmust require
release upon satisfaction of the substantive criterialisted.275
State courts considering the issue have held that a program that is
elaborately structured will not create a liberty interest as long as the decision
maker is operating under a broad grant of discretion. An early release
program in New Jersey276 and criteria used for determining parole in
Maine were not sufficiently restrictive to implicate the Due Process
Clause.2r7
As of this writing, the most recent United States Supreme Court
decision regarding whether particular statutory/regulatory language creates
an entitlement for offenders is Kentucky Department of Corrections v.
Thompson.278 Kentucky inmates sued alleging a violation of due process
when the Commonwealth issued a consent decree suspending visits without
a hearing. The inmates relied on language from a 1980 consent decree that
stated: "'The Bureau of Corrections encourages and agrees to maintain
visitation at least at the current level, with minimal restrictions,'" and to
"'continue [its] open visiting policy.'" 279
The Commonwealth subsequently issued two procedures to govern visits. This combination of
procedures, the inmates argued, created a liberty interest that required due
process. However, they did not argue that the constitution or state statutes
created such a right.
The Thompson Court first underscored that it is necessary to "examine
closely the language of the relevant regulations."" 0 The Court further
noted that protected liberty interests are created when the state places
"'substantive limitations on official discretion.'" 28' Commonly, this is
accomplished by 1) establishing "substantive predicates" and by 2)
mandating the outcome when relevant criteria are met. The Court found
that such predicates existed under the Kentucky visiting procedures but then
examined the mandate aspect. It observed that, in order to create a liberty
interest, a state's language must be "'explicitly mandatory' . . . , i.e.
specific directives to the decision maker that if the regulations' substantive

275. Id. (emphasis added).
276. See, e.g., Raymond v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 534 A.2d 741,743 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1987).
277. See, e.g., Mahaney v. State, 610 A.2d 738, 742 (Me. 1992).
278. 490 U.S. 454 (1989).
279. Id. (citing Kendrick v. Bland, 541 F. Supp. 21, 37 (W.D. Ky. 1981)).
280, Id. at 461.
281. Id. at 462 (citations omitted).
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predicates are present, a particular outcome must follow, in order to create
a liberty interest."2
The court found no mandatory language in the
procedures existed, citing to passages such as "a visitor 'may be excluded'"
and "'administrative staff reserves the right to allow or disallow vis-

its." 2

Thompson is significant for many reasons. Over Justice Marshall's
dissent, the Court once again rejected the grievous loss analysis of
prisoners' due process rights.'
Additionally, despite protestations by
some courts that mandatory language is not "talismanic," the Court in
Thompson looked for language that makes outcomes virtually unavoidable
Finally, in
to establish the substantive limitation on official discretion.2
dicta, the Court noted that "'consequences visited on the prisoner that are
qualitatively different from the punishment characteristically suffered by a
person convicted of crime'" may invoke the Fourteenth Amendment. 6
Cases following Thompson suggest that obvious efforts to avoid creating
a right can succeed,' that clumsy disclaimers will be given effect,"8
and that "shall" does not mean "shall."29
C. Do ParoleRelease Guidelines Create a Liberty Interest

Protected by Due Process?
1. Creation of a Liberty Interest by Parole Guidelines
No United States Supreme Court decision has declared that a liberty

282. Id. at 463 (citations omitted).
283. Thompson, 490 U.S. at 463-64.
284. See id. at 454, 467.
285. See id. at 464-65.
286. Id. at 460 (quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980)).
287. See Wallace v. Robinson, 940 F.2d 243,246 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that the statute did
not create a liberty or property interest, the court noted that "[w]easel words such as 'in so far
as possible' in [a statute] show that Illinois has not assured its inmates any job, let alone the job
the inmate prefers"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1563 (1992).
288. See Patten v. North Dakota Parole Bd., 783 F.2d 140, 143 (8th Cir. 1986) (per curiam)
(holding that no liberty interest had been created, the court relied in part on a statement in the
Inmate Handbook that "'It]he Board is interested in [the prisoner] as an individual, and there are
no hard and fast rules'").
289. Fox v. Custis, 372 S.E.2d 373, 377 (Va. 1988). The Virginia Supreme Court, hearing
a § 1983 suit against parole officers based on negligent supervision, stated:
The statutory provision, using the word "shall," does not require a parole officer to
arrest and reincarcerate, pending a hearing, every parolee who violates a condition
of parole, however minor. In the sense used in that statute, the word "shall" is
merely directory in meaning and not mandatory. Courts, in endeavoring to arrive at
the meaning of language in a will, contract, or a statute, often are compelled to
construe "shall" as permissive in accordance with the subject matter and content.
Id. (citation omitted).
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interest in sentencing exists. Neither the Supreme Court nor any state
supreme court has expressly held that state sentencing guidelines, absent
mandatory language, create a liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court has not squarely answered the question of
whether federal sentencing guidelines, in light of their mandatory nature,
create a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, although Justice
Souter has expressed the view that they do create such an interest. 29°
Thus, the jurisprudence on sentencing guidelines would not support an
argument that parole guidelines create a liberty interest.
Considering parole cases, the Supreme Court has used an entitlement
analysis and held in Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal &
Correctional Complei 9 1 that inmates do not have a protected liberty
interest in parole unless the state created the interest. State court decisions
adhere to that precept. Meachum v. Fano2' appears to have eliminated
the prospect of a successful argument that parole release decisions deserve
due process protections because they inflict a grievous loss.2" Whether
particular parole release guidelines create a liberty interest depends primarily
on whether the words of the statute or regulation appear to create an
entitlement. Unfortunately, in Greenholtz, the Court embarked upon a path
which has proven to be improvident because entitlement analysis simply fails
to distinguish between discretionary and nondiscretionary systems of parole.
The dual requirements of mandatory language and substantive predicates
yield results that are inconsistent and unsupported by policy.
This analysis first considers statutes that contain explicitly permissive
language. One may compare the statutes by reducing them to the following
formula: The board may release if condition Y exists, Y being a discretionary determination essentially subjective and often predictive in nature. 2"
Variations on the formula include: The board may release when Y; 2
when Y, the board may release; 2" and the board shall have the power to
release when Y. 29 The determination Y can represent a number of
discretionary, predictive conclusions that the board can reach. These

290. Bums v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2182, 2192 (1991) (Souter, J., dissenting).
291. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
292. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
293. Id. at 224.
294. E.g., Wagner v. Gilligan, 609 F.2d 866, 867 (6th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). For text of
the relevant statute, see supra note 242.
295. E.g., Candelaria v. Griffin, 641 F.2d 868, 869 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). For text
of the relevant statute, see supra note 245.
296. E.g., Gale v. Moore, 763 F.2d 341, 343 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam). For text of the
relevant statute, see supra note 248.
297. E.g., Gilmore v. Kansas Parole Bd., 756 P.2d 410, 414 (Kan.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
930 (1988). For text of the relevant statute, see supra note 249.
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conclusions include: reasonable grounds to believe release would "further
the interests of justice" consistent with the welfare and security of the
public;298 a finding that release would serve the best interests of society
and that the prisoner is able and willing to abide by the law; 2 a finding
that release would not detrimentally affect the community or the offender;"° and a finding that release would be in the best interest of society and
the prisoner poses no further threat to society. 0 1
Another variety of the formula introduces condition X, which is an
objective, factual finding that appears to be subordinate to determination Y
and is illustrated as follows: The board may release when X (the prisoner
offers proof he can support himself) and y;3ta and prisoners who X (have
good conduct records) may be released if Y.303 Finally, other statutes in
this category take a direct approach and provide specifically that the board
need not release if it decides that release is unwise. 3 4
These explicitly permissive language statutes clearly contain no
mandated outcomes because the words "may" and "shall have the power"
permit but do not require release. Conditions Y are expressed in abstract
terms and amount to subjective predictions of future events. These statutes
grant the broadest discretion to parole boards. The highly discretionary
nature of this power is the gravamen of the Court's position that parole
305
generates no protectible liberty interest.
The introduction of condition X, the factual finding, leads the analysis
in the direction of structured discretion. However, the inconsistency
inherent in the entitlement language analysis does not become apparent until
one considers those statutes which state that an offender "shall not be
released unless" or "shall be released only when" certain conditions are
met. In these statutes, condition Y, the subjective prediction, appears in
conjunction with mandatory language. Together, they are generally held to
leave parole discretion unfettered because the statute mandates only that the

298. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.03 (Anderson 1993), quoted in Wagner, 609 F.2d
at 867.
299. E.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 47-7-3 (1993), quoted in Irving v. Thigpen, 732 F.2d 1215,
1217 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
300. E.g., Mo. STAT. ANN. § 217.690(1) (Vernon Supp. 1993), quoted in Gale v. Moore, 763
F.2d at 343.
301. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 20-223(c) (Supp. 1993), quoted in Izatt v. State, 661 P.2d 763,764765 (Idaho 1983).
302. E.g., Candelariav. Griffin, 641 F.2d 868, 869 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). For text
of the relevant statute, see supra note 244.
303. E.g., Irving v. Thigpen, 732 F.2d at 1217. For text of the relevant statute, see supra
note 245.
304. E.g., Schuernann v. Colorado State Bd. of Adult Parole, 624 F.2d 172, 174 & n.2 (10th
Cir. 1980). For text of the relevant statute, see supra note 243.
305. See Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 378 n.10 (1987).
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board will exercise its discretion. A statute which provides that no person
shall be paroled unless Y, prevents a board from paroling a particular
inmate when a particular.subjective prediction is made. However, the board
enjoys complete discretion in determining whether this prediction is
probable. Courts have determined that the statute does not restrain the
power of the board." 6 The inconsistency arises when that analysis is
applied to the Nebraska statute in Greenholtz, which provided this formula:
The board shall parole unless Y1, Y2, Y3, or Y4. "Shall" mandates that
release be ordered unless a particular subjective prediction is made.
However, the board enjoys complete discretion in determining whether the
prediction is probable. The Court's interpretation suggested that the statute
created a universe of parole eligible prisoners who were beyond the reach
of the .board, but then left the definition of that universe to the board's
discretion.
Only one statute from the "shall not/unless" or "shall/only when"
group, that governing the Illinois board, created a liberty interest. 307 That
statute provided that the board shall not parole if Y,, or Y2 , or Y3.318 The
court stated that the Illinois statute was merely the negative of Nebraska's
"shall/if" statute. 3 9 The Illinois lawmakers created a universe of parole
eligible inmates who were outside the board's parole power by reasons of
the existence of a condition to be determined in the board's discretion.
The category of statutes that uses elaborate and explicit guidelines to
structure discretion provides the most sound basis for finding an entitlement
in theory because, in combination with mandatory language, objective
criteria can meaningfully constrain a decision maker's power. Unfortunately, neither of the cases cited in Board of Pardons v. Allen"' actually
constrains decision makers. 1
Further, those cases are distinguishable

306. E.g., Patten v. North Dakota Parole Bd., 783 F.2d 140, 142 (8th Cir. 1986) (per curiam);
Berard v. State of Vt. Parole Bd., 730 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1984). For text of relevant statutes,
see supra notes 260-61.
307. United States ex reL Scott v. Illinois Parole & Pardon Bd., 669 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1048 (1982) (per curiam).
308. For text of the relevant Illinois statute, see supra note 265. Many variations in this
category of statute exist as well. Patten, 783 F.2d at 142 (exemplifying the variation that no
parole can be granted unless X and Y, see supra note 260); Booth v. Hammock, 605 F.2d 661,
663 (2d Cir. 1979) (demonstrating the variation that parole shall not be granted for X but for Y,

see supra note 263).
309. Scott, 669 F.2d at 1188.
310. 482 U.S. 369, 378 (1987).
311. Winsett v. McGinnes, 617 F.2d 996, 1006 (3rd Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1093 (1981), did not rely on the mandatory language plus substantive predicates analysis.
The court was persuaded that a liberty interest existed because the overall design of the workrelease program, including multi-tiered recommendations, impeded the discretion of the prison
administration. Likewise, in Green v. Black, 755 F.2d 687, 688-89 (8th Cir. 1985), the court
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because they relate to the powers of prison administrators. Those powers
are substantially less than the powers of parole boards.
The cases tell us that substantive predicates, the Y and the X conditions, will enlighten a court's inquiry as to whether a liberty interest exists
under entitlement analysis. However, the decisions are not as instructive as
one might hope. What is meant by "substantive predicate?" Greenholtz did
not mention the term, but noted that "[tihe Board argues . . . that a
presumption [of release] would be created only if the statutory conditions for
deferral were essentially factual . . . rather than predictive."" 2 No
response to that argument was made.
The 1983 Court adopted the two-part analysis of mandatory language
plus substantive predicates in Hewitt v. Helms. 3 In Hewitt the Court
identified "the need for control" and "the threat of a serious disturbance"
as substantive predicates without which the confinement of an inmate to
administrative segregation could not be ordered. 314 Together they placed
a check on the discretion of prison administrators. In Olim v. Wakinekond1 5 an inmate argued that "optimum placement" of the offender in the
prison was a substantive predicate. Reversing the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, the Supreme Court rejected the inmate's argument that transfer to
another prison violated a protected liberty interest. The Court reasoned that
the regulation provided no standards to govern the administrator's exercise
of discretion. 6 Apparently, it was already established that classification
as a substantive predicate does not require all measures of discretion to be
eliminated. However, the degree of residual discretion that would support
a substantive predicate remained to be seen.
Board of Pardons v. Allen3 17 best demonstrates the folly of entitlement analysis in parole cases. In Allen the Montana statute at issue
provided that a prisoner shall be released when "'reasonable probability
[exists] that the prisoner can be released without detriment to the prisoner
or to the community. '"318 The substantive predicates were (1)that release
would not cause detriment to the prisoner and (2) that the prisoner is "'able
and willing to fulfill the obligations of a law-abiding citizen. '"319 Both
predicates are predictive in nature and based on the board members'

focused on whether the regulation of the sex offender program encumbered the administration's
discretion.
312. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979).

313. 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
314. Id. at 472.

315. 461 U.S. 238 (1983).
316. Id. at 249.
317. 482 U.S. 369 (1987).
318. Id. at 376 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-201(1) (1985)).
319. Id. at 376-77 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. 46-23-201(2) (1985)).
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subjective assessments, as the majority conceded quoting from Greenholtz. 32 32
The
dissenters correctly challenged the intellectual honesty of the
1
majority.
The substantive predicates in the Montana statute clearly do not abridge
discretion. Whether release could be a detriment to a given prisoner is
highly subjective. In most cases that appear before a board, factual support
for a decision going either way is possible. Cases in which support for only
one position exists are the kinds of cases that will only be decided the
alternate way if the board abused its discretion. That a prisoner is "able and
willing to fulfill the obligation of a law-abiding citizen" is even more
subjective because board members will interpret the prisoner's assertions,
conduct record, and assessments by others to make this judgment.
Other Supreme Court applications of the mandatory language and
substantive predicates test do not clarify distinctions. The substantive
predicates in Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompsonim appeared in two footnotes that presented a set of nine non-exhaustive reasons
to deny visitation, with six procedures to implement them.3" These
factors are among the most objective set to appear before the Court as
substantive predicates. However, the absence of mandatory language caused
the court to find that no liberty interest existed. Despite a regulation that
provided that "an inmate is allowed to have three (3) adult visitors . . . per
visit," despite the grounds for denial which the court admits are substantive
predicates, and despite a consent decree that promised to preserve the
described visitation policy, the Court found discretion was not limited and
allowed visits to be denied without providing the inmate an opportunity to
be heard. 3"
Finally, the statute in Washington v. Harper" provided that forced
anti-psychotic medication may be administered only if a combination of Y
and X existed. Specifically, the substantive predicates were (1) that the
prisoner suffered from a mental disorder and (2) that the prisoner was
gravely disabled or posed a threat to himself or others. 26 These predicates were sufficiently objective to fetter the discretion of the institution.
Despite Justice Brennan's attempt to order and categorize these statutes,
all of the statutes are similar because they make the systems substantially
discretionary. The Supreme Court's substantive predicates analysis instructs

320. Id. at 381.
321. See id. at 381 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
322. 490 U.S. 454 (1989).
323. Id. at 455 n. 1, 458-59 n.2.
324. Id. at 465.
325. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
326. Id. at 221.
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that discretionary predictions about future criminality circumscribe parole
board discretion by using mandatory language.327 The Court states that
institutional security32 is a substantive predicate, but "optimum placement" of an inmate in prison is not.329
Real limitations on parole board discretion can exist despite the fact that
neither the statutes in Greenholtz nor Allen constituted such limitations.
Further, the analysis of circuit court cases categorized in Allen provides no
additional guidance for parole boards.
Turning the analysis away from the course the Supreme Court has taken
is advisable. A reasonable balance between the broad interests of public
safety and procedural protections for individuals would be better served by
conceding what everyone knows but the Supreme Court is unwilling to
recognize: the prisoner's liberty is the single stake in the outcome of parole
hearings. The present course has generated much litigation and many
unworkable distinctions.33 ° Despite the Court's assertion that certain
words are not "talismanic," 331 efforts to identify constrained discretion are
characterized by niggling differentiation leading to classifications that bear
no relation to reality.
Ultimately, society would be better off taking the spotlight off liberty
interest and placing it instead on due process. The challenge is to permit
states to experiment with ways to meet their criminal justice goals and, at
the same time, refine guidance for the states regarding what process is
constitutionally required.
2. The Process Due
The function of the legal process is to promote reliable decisions based
on accurate and complete facts.332 Several interests are balanced in parole
release decisions. The offender has an interest in fair consideration for
release (whether it is denominated a liberty interest or not), including the
ability to bring all relevant information to the board's attention.
That due process is a flexible concept is well established in American
law. Due process allows the particular conditions to determine the
procedural protections necessary.333 In due process cases courts are

327. Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377-78 (1987); Greenholtz v. Inmates of the
Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1979).
328. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471 (1983).
329. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 242 (1983).
330. To concede a liberty interest in parole will not necessarily require the same result in other
areas.
331. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-12.
332. Id. at 12.
333. Id.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1994

45

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:567

unwilling to do more than pass on the constitutionality of the particular
process under review. Determining constitutionality is a task requiring the
court to strike a balance between the interests of the state and the interests
of the individual. 34
The Supreme Court has held that a procedure which allows at least one
hearing every year for each eligible inmate is constitutionally adequate, but
that a formal hearing for all inmates is not required each year. 331 It
further held that one month's advance notice as to the day of the hearing,
with notice of the time on the day of the hearing, was sufficient to meet
constitutional requirements. 33 The Court concluded that, while reasons
for denial of parole were required as a guide for the inmate's future
behavior, due process did not require a recitation of evidence relied upon
for that denial.337
The Eighth Circuit has held that due process requires an inmate to be
advised of adverse information that may lead to an unfavorable parole
decision so that the inmate is given an opportunity to address the information. 338 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that due process was
invoked by the state-created liberty interest; however, it required no more
than informing
the inmates as to how they fell short of qualifying for
339
parole.
Minimal fairness in any parole setting should mandate: (1) a hearing
with notice, (2) an opportunity for the inmate to present relevant information, (3) notice of the criteria used to make the parole decision, and (4)
notice of the decision together with reasons for denial. Parole guidelines
can assist in ensuring the presence of these indicia of fairness. Furthermore,
these procedures are already followed in many jurisdictions.340
The parole hearing with reasonable notice is the cornerstone of the
parole process. It enhances the reliability of the outcome by causing
relevant information to be gathered and discussed in the presence of the
parole applicant. It is an essential component of fairness because it provides
the inmates the opportunity to speak on their own behalf. The meaningful

334. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
335. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 14-15.
336. Id. at 14 n.6.
337. Id. at 15. The Supreme Court never addressed the adequacy of procedures in Boardof
Pardons v. Allen because the case was remanded due to the district court's denial of the claim.
See 482 U.S. 369 (1987).
338. Williams v. Missouri Bd. ofProbation& Parole, 661 F.2d 697,700 (8th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 993 (1982).
339. State v. Tillinghast, 609 A.2d 217 (R.I. 1992). Although mandatory parole release
guidelines were in place, the court found a state-created right based on Greenholtz authority
alone. See id.
340. E.g., Colorado and Minnesota.
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notice is given sufficiently in advance of the hearing to allow the inmates
time to prepare, and the specific amount of time required will differ under
the circumstances. For example, a system which allows the inmates to have
people speak on their behalf might require more notice than one which does
not.
Another way to heighten the reliability of parole decisions is to allow
the applicants to present evidence, either testimonial or documentary, that
supports their petition. The inmates have the greatest incentive to see that
certain information is brought to the attention of the board. A system that
relies only on the prison for information about offenders is pregnant with the
potential for arbitrary, discriminatory action.
The greatest opportunity for release guidelines to add to the fairness of
parole hearings is by giving notice of criteria that will be used to make the
parole decision. Forewarned with these criteria, inmates are able to adjust
their institutional conduct to improve their chances of being paroled.
Guidelines inform the inmates of what information would be relevant to
present at the hearing. With sufficient opportunity for departure, the
guideline's criteria provide a means of accomplishing uniformity, proportionality, and predictability without unduly fettering appropriate exercise of
a parole board's discretion.
Notice of the decision and reasons for denial are the final procedural
protection essential to fairness. Notice of the decision is always provided,
but some states do not require statements of reasons for denial. Such
statements inform unsuccessful parole applicants of the circumstances which
account for the denial. When those circumstances are within the inmates'
control, they can then elect whether to address them. They can provide the
parole board with evidence relevant to likelihood of recidivism. Requiring
a statement of reasons for denial guards against arbitrary decisions by the
board. Unless pro forma, these statements require boards to articulate the
rationale which drove their decision. Knowledge that explanations win be
required is an effective guard against arbitrary decisions.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Despite the confusion in the case law, it is easy enough to avoid
creating a liberty interest. Misgivings over the possibility of creating a
liberty interest should not induce a board to forego the benefit of release
guidelines. Even when state statutes create a liberty interest, the required
procedural protections are modest.
Parole release guidelines afford the parole board the greatest degree of
flexibility if they are drafted in discretionary language. Quantifiable factors
that appear in tandem with discretionary factors are likely to avoid creating
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a liberty interest.3 4' Most importantly, release guidelines should contain
a statement of purpose which clarifies that no entitlement is intended.
Guidelines developed by a broad-based coalition of practitioners and citizens
result in a better product and provide important support for adoption.
Guidelines that are implemented by rules provide more flexibility than
statutory guidelines because changes can be made without resort to the
legislative process. Parole release guidelines require monitoring, particularly during the period immediately after adoption. Allowance should be made
for departures, and departures should be examined for patterns suggesting
that the guidelines themselves require further adjustment.
Parole boards seeking to make rational, fair decisions can benefit
tremendously by adopting release guidelines. Guidelines direct and limit
discretion; without them discretion is freewheeling. In this writer's
experience as a parole board member, directed discretion is essential to
sound decision making. After a certain volume of cases, the human mind
is incapable of producing consistent, fair parole release decisions without
some means of sorting out relevant factors. Criminals become difficult to
distinguish - all burglars seem alike so their sentences may not be
individualized at all. This does not imply that the periods of incarceration
will be uniform - often they are not - but, unfortunately, the considerable
variation among them may be the consequence of irrelevant factors.
Today's burglars appear on a calendar with rapists and murderers so their
term of incarceration may be shorter than that of tomorrow's burglars who
appear on a calendar with check forgers and petty larcenists. The rapist
whose victim presents testimony before the board may receive a longer term
of incarceration than another rapist whose victim does not appear. Tired
parole board members may be more lenient to the last inmate on the day's
calendar because they lack the energy for a protracted discussion. The drug
dealer who appears before a panel of board members whose primary
penological philosophy is to incapacitate offenders will not fare as well as
one who appears before a panel whose penological philosophy is to
rehabilitate them. None of these circumstances advance any legitimate
criminal justice purpose; yet, in certain cases, they are the only explanation
for different treatment of like inmates.
Parole release guidelines can reduce inmates' attempts to manipulate the

341. See, e.g., Hall v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 806 P.2d 217, 218 (Utah. Ct. App. 1991). The
court stated: "The guidelines used by the Utah Board of Pardons in the present case do not have
the force and effect of law. They are not mandatory standards which must be followed, but
merely guidelines used to clarify the Board's exercise of discretion without altering any of the
existing considerations for parole release." Id. Hall has recently been abrogated by the Utah
Supreme Court in Labrum v. Utah State Board of Pardons, No. 920222, 1993 WL 512821, at
*10 (Utah Dec. 6, 1993), to the extent it is contrary to the holding of Foote v. Utah Boardof
Pardons,discussed supra notes 252-54.
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board by limiting the impact of their statements in the hearing without
negating them entirely. The use of release guidelines to educate the public
concerning the various factors weighed by board members and the
limitations on resources can greatly improve a board's public image. This
use can foster the perception of a professional board with integrity.
Parole release guidelines allow a conscious allocation of resources.
Guidelines can, for example, act as a means of implementing a system-wide
goal of reducing reliance on incarceration as a punishment for non-violent
offenders. When prison crowding forces releases, emergency release
guidelines can assist boards in selecting for early release inmates least likely
to pose a threat to the community. They can enable planners to make more
accurate projections about future prison populations.
The impact of release guidelines can extend beyond release. They may
be used in supervision to determine when certain conditions are appropriate
to include in an inmate's parole agreement. Even revocation of parole is a
process that can benefit from guideline direction.
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